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The Supreme Court’s decision on Marriage Equality legalised same sex marriage across the 
United States, and marked the culmination of decades of legal struggle, political 
partisanship and social activism. This thesis examines how network television has used 
same sex marriage as a happy ending for its gay and lesbian characters, and how this 
perpetuates a narrative that Marriage Equality signifies a happy ending for the LGBTQ 
rights movement.   
By using theories from cultural, sociological and economic fields this thesis constructs 
network television as neoliberal, and examines its output not just as an artistic product, but 
as a reflection of the political positions of its audiences and its financiers. By drawing on the 
works of Sara Ahmed and Lisa Duggan, this work argues that the connections made 
between marriage and happiness, privilege homonormativity as happiness causing and 
casts queerness as the source of gay unhappiness. The programmes analysed portray their 
characters’ problems as solved by marriage, reinforcing the idea of Marriage Equality as a 
solution to the problems of the LGBTQ community. However, as the political landscape has 
changed, so has the way network television engages with gay and lesbian unhappiness, 
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Marriage Equality defines a generational shift in how gay people live their lives in the USA. 
The Supreme Court’s decision to legalise same sex marriages across the United States was 
the culmination of a decades long to-and-fro between progressive states exercising their 
rights to marry same sex couples within their state constitutions, conservative groups 
lobbying to overturn those decisions, and the political right working to explicitly legislate 
against same-sex marriages. As gay marriage rights were granted and revoked numerous 
times at the state level: the passing of DOMA (the Defence of Marriage Act) in 1996 took 
the debate to the federal level, ensuring that even if a state granted same sex couples the 
right to marry, those couples would not receive the same federal benefits as heterosexual 
couples. DOMA defined marriage on a federal level as between one man and one woman, 
and allowed states to refuse to recognise same sex marriages performed legally in other 
states. In 2011, Barack Obama declared DOMA to be unconstitutional, and instructed the 
Department of Justice to stop defending the law. This decision provided precedent for 
several challenges to same sex marriage bans at the state level, with ten more states 
legalising same sex marriage over the next two years. This momentum culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s decision on Marriage Equality in 2015 which reversed the effects of 
DOMA and restored federal benefits to same sex married couples - enshrining the rights of 
same sex couples to marry across the USA into the constitution (Deschamps & Singer, 
2017).  
Same sex marriage rights were a public priority for several gay rights groups and 
campaigners. Organisations such as the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and GLAAD which 
received high profile support from celebrities and politicians, contributed to making 
marriage equality a zeitgeist issue in the early half of the 2010s. Such organisations and 
campaigns like NOH8 which specifically focussed on reversing Proposition 8 which banned 
same sex marriage in California, were criticised by more radical groups, who believed that 
the focus on marriage equality eclipsed less photogenic issues like LGBTQ homelessness, 
AIDS research, or the murders of trans individuals.  
This tension between groups focussed on gaining access to institutions like marriage or the 
military, and more radical groups who rejected assimilationist techniques has been a long 
standing feature of the gay rights movement. This tension has been pinpointed as a flaw in 
the strategy of the movement, with the continued focus on assimilation as a reason why 
the movement had failed to gain significant traction earlier in its inception, when groups 
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such as the Mattachine Society and the Gay Liberation Front held these differing opinions 
on how the movement should proceed (Engel, 2001). 
In this thesis I explore how the Marriage Equality decision of 2015, and the prioritisation of 
marriage rights by mainstream LGBTQ rights campaigns in the years leading up to the 
decision, have influenced representations of gay and lesbian happiness on US network 
television. I discuss how connections are made between marriage, happiness and endings, 
and how through these connections, marriage has become a common “happy ending” for 
gay characters in network programming. I will ask whether these representations of 
happiness contribute to a wider idea that Marriage Equality forms a happy ending for the 
LGBTQ rights campaign as a whole, and that access to marriage is the solution for all gay 
problems. I will draw from Sara Ahmed’s work interrogating the concept of happiness in 
order to understand how marriage is tied to happiness and how happiness can be 
restrictive and work against fights for equality.  I will argue that network television works to 
reinforce the connections between marriage and happiness, and that this connection is 
specific to its gay and lesbian characters, echoing Ahmed’s construction of happiness as a 
“straightening device” by placing gay and lesbian identities into a neoliberal frame which 
demands assimilation and homonormativity in exchange for the possibility of a happy life, 
and a happy ending.  
Whilst there has been plenty of research into representations of gay and lesbian characters 
on television, and how these representations have changed over time (Becker, 2006; 
Tropiano, 2002; Streitmatter, 2009), and work interrogating the valorisation of same sex 
marriage rights within the LGBTQ rights movement (Kirsch, 2000; Conrad, 2014, Duggan, 
2002), this thesis more specifically examines the intersection of television, economics and 
politics, working to analyse how network representations of gayness are influenced not 
only by shifts in public opinion, but by political history and the networks’ economic model. 
Canonical texts such as Becker’s Gay TV and Straight America provide a historical reading of 
gay and lesbian representations, showing how the USA’s changing political and social 
landscape affected how gay people were shown on the small screen. This thesis draws from 
such work, arguing that television is influenced by the society of its time, but also suggests 
that television works to influence society to perhaps the same extent. This work views 
television as not just a mirror to society, or an instrument of social change, but rather both 
– simultaneously trying to capture public opinion and working to change it, intentionally or 
not. Furthermore, this thesis uses Ahmed’s work on happiness as a lens through which to 
view these network gay and lesbian characters. Ahmed’s work has been applied to 
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television before (Brady, Burns & Davis, 2018), but not from a television studies 
perspective, and not in the specific context of marriage equality.  
This thesis responds to arguments surrounding the use of assimilationist tactics in the 
LGBTQ rights movement, and asks whether equality is truly won if it exists only under the 
requirement of adherence to heterosexual and patriarchal institutions. The work also 
interacts with questions around the extent to which television influences and is influenced 
by society, and to what lengths historical and political context can be seen in fictional 
representations of gay and lesbian characters. By interrogating the connections between 
happiness and marriage, this thesis also engages with queer critiques of same sex marriage 
and its prioritisation within the movement, alongside feminist critiques of the privileging of 
marriage as a tool of patriarchal capitalism.  
To understand the significance of Marriage Equality one must first understand what 
“marriage” means to the gay and lesbian community1. R. Claire Snyder writes in Gay 
Marriage and Democracy: 
When lesbians and gay men struggle politically for the right to marry, they are 
seeking the state sanctioned civil contract that guarantees a significant set of legal 
benefits to married couples, ones that help them take care of each other financially 
(health insurance, tax benefits, retirement planning) and support each other during 
difficult times (medical decision making, family and bereavement leave, “spousal 
privilege” in the courtroom), as well as enable them to provide for their children 
(second-parent adoption, child custody and visitation in cases of divorce, Social 
Security survivorship benefits). The political struggle for same-sex marriage is not 
about the religious rite. (2006, 15) 
Snyder claims here that marriage’s legal and economic benefits are the primary reason for 
the LGBTQ community’s fight for same sex marriage. In a country where healthcare is fully 
privatised and legal marriage could provide access to that healthcare, marriage rights can 
often mean life or death. One can easily see how, after the destruction wrought by the 
AIDS crisis, healthcare access and the ability to share that access with one’s partner would 
become a primary concern for the community. The relative lack of rights and privileges 
                                                          
1 Though Marriage Equality impacted the LGBTQ community as a whole, this thesis focuses more 
specifically on its connections with the gay and lesbian sections of that community. Of course, these 
umbrella terms cover a wide range of diverse identities. Here they are used generally to describe 
those whose relationships are primarily same sex.  
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afforded by civil partnerships, for example, would have come into sharp relief when visiting 
a loved one in hospital and surviving a partner’s early death had become common shared 
experiences for gay men and trans individuals in the USA. A legally married couple can 
share health insurance, they are each other’s automatic next of kin, they are entitled to 
visitation rights in hospital and to benefits after surviving their spouse. Practically then, 
marriage means the potential for stability and security in the face of disease and death. The 
2015 Supreme Court decision ensured that said stability was available nationwide, 
significantly changing the way that gay couples interacted with the legal system and the 
government.  
Such benefits however are only truly a reality for those whose class and race already 
provide a level of financial security. A gay man may only use his husband’s healthcare 
package if his husband has health insurance to begin with – an ideal which is often out of 
reach for many outside of the white middle class (Conrad, 2014). What else then provides 
the basis for the push for Marriage Equality? Alongside economic and legal benefits, 
marriage also holds symbolic value. Snyder includes in her list of components of marriage 
“the community recognized relationship” (2006, 15). Marriage, begun with a wedding, 
recognises a relationship in front of family and friends. The government sanctioning of a 
marriage recognises said relationship at a federal level. For weddings performed in a 
religious setting, marriages are recognised by God. This recognition acknowledges not only 
the commitment that the couple is making to each other, but also the very existence and 
legitimacy of their relationship. When two people get married, they often affirm their 
commitment to their community by celebrating with a wedding. The significance of a public 
display of affection and commitment, witnessed, acknowledged, and celebrated by the 
community, is particularly stark when discussed in terms of homosexuality, which is 
historically associated with secrecy and shame. Specifically for the USA, where fourteen 
states still have laws against sodomy in their statutes, the ability to not just be openly gay, 
but to have a gay relationship sanctioned by the state, celebrated by one’s community and, 
in some cases, even blessed by the church, signifies a final casting off of the closet, with gay 
relationships being legally held to the same standards as their straight counterparts.  
The concept of marriage as a lasting acknowledgement of the legitimacy of gay 
relationships, and gay love itself, also creates some problems. It is clear that for many gay 
people, Marriage Equality has not made the closet disappear. For those gay people whose 
communities are not supportive, whose geography, class, or race make living their lives 
openly difficult, it is unclear whether Marriage Equality has had a positive effect, or 
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whether the federal decision to legalise same sex marriage (and overrule states’ rights) has 
in effect worsened the homophobia they encounter by having homosexuality encroach 
upon what was formerly an exclusively heterosexual institution (Stanley, 2014).  
Finally, marriage marks a commitment to a future life together. In performing a wedding 
and committing to a marriage, one therefore acknowledges the existence of a future. 
Future is not something often afforded to gay people in popular culture. While gay 
characters in the movies were dying of AIDS (Philadelphia, Rent), being beaten to death in a 
hate crime (Brokeback Mountain), or committing suicide (The Hours), TV characters were 
shown too briefly to have a narrative arc at all – acting as occasional comic relief or “very 
special episode” morality lessons before disappearing from the programme entirely 
(Becker, 2006, 182). Same sex marriage then, not only promises a future, it celebrates the 
existence of a gay future, of a long, gay, life not cut short by illness or violence, and of a 
lasting gay relationship, contravening stereotypes of gay promiscuity and hook-up culture.  
I have chosen to review representations of gay and lesbian happiness in network television, 
specifically because of the medium’s relationship with its audience. As networks are funded 
by advertisers, their existence depends on audience satisfaction (Anderson, 2005,77). In 
order to be successful, networks must create content that generates mass viewership. 
Creators pitching programming to a network must be able to prove that their show will 
draw in viewers from across various demographics and appease advertisers who are careful 
to maintain their brand’s integrity. This business model puts network television in a 
precarious place; its products must have mass appeal and be inoffensive enough for people 
of all walks of life and political persuasions to enjoy, but must also be new and interesting 
enough to capture audience attentions in an ever growing landscape of televisual choice. 
Network television cannot afford to be niche or controversial, it must find a safe space 
between conservative mass appeal and forward thinking boundary breaking. If the 
networks stay too safe, they risk losing audience numbers to premium cable channels, or 
now to streaming services, which are less regulated and whose business models allow for 
programming with narrower target audiences. However, taking too many chances or 
pushing too many boundaries risks the networks losing their hold on the American family, 
and losing advertiser dollars, and confidence in the process (Becker, 2006). I argue that this 
tension between conservativism and progressivism positions network television in a 
neoliberal space, with its economic model prioritising capitalism above all else, and its 
revenue relying on content which sits comfortably between the political aisles. As further 
examined in Chapter Two, I argue that a neoliberal contextualisation of network television 
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allows for a specific reading of how the medium approaches its gay characters. The 
introduction of gay narratives onto network television came about during the onset of paid 
cable channels such as HBO and Showtime using gay narratives to add shock value to their 
schedule to draw viewers away from safe, wholesome network channels. Networks had to 
prove themselves to be contemporary and show they weren’t being left behind in order to 
win back the viewers from pay cable, and win over gay audiences who were fast becoming 
attractive to advertisers because of their supposed affluence and trendsetter status 
(Becker, 2006).  
Network television, because of its economic dependency on mass spectrum audience 
satisfaction and its reliance on creating what it thinks the USA as a whole is interested in 
watching, becomes a useful barometer of public opinion (Mills, 2006). Not only does 
network television reflect shifts in culture, by creating programming intended to appeal to 
audiences across the US and refrain from causing offence, but it also influences such shifts, 
allowing audiences to familiarise themselves with sections of society they may not have 
any direct experience of. In terms of gay and lesbian representation, network television has 
a storied history of how it presented homosexuality on its screens. As discussed by Stephen 
Tropiano, the inclusion of gay characters and gay storylines on US television began in the 
1960s with documentary programming seeking to inform audiences about the existence of 
homosexuality and went through several phases in fictional representations of gay 
characters; a spate of gay storylines in the 1970s on medical dramas where homosexuality 
was often treated as a medical complaint, a trend in 70s police procedurals which featured 
female police officers accused of lesbianism, AIDS focused storylines during the 1980s, and 
a shift to more nuanced portrayals of gay lead characters in the 1990s. Throughout these 
earlier periods in gay representation, television focused on gayness as tragedy, as a 
problem to be solved, a medical illness or a mental health issue, a threat to one’s career, as 
a cause of isolation, sickness, and, ultimately, death. Programming portraying gay victims of 
HIV and AIDS often explored how homophobia affected the treatment such characters 
received and “openly criticised the American health care system for allowing the gay stigma 
attached to the disease to affect the quality of care being offered to AIDS patients.” 
(Tropiano, 2002, 33). Such characters were shown as not only victims of a physical disease, 
which at the time was intrinsically linked to homosexuality, but also as victims of 
discrimination, their gayness condemning them to an early death in more ways than one. 
Through these early representations, gayness became linked to sadness and tragedy, and 
straightness was reinforced as a bringer of happiness and security.  
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The change from these earlier tragic representations of homosexuality, to more 
superficially positive representations of gay characters in sitcoms in the 1990s is indicative 
of the popularisation of identity politics in the US during that time. The US shifted from an 
“American Creed” approach to national identity, which valorised sameness under the 
banner of American citizenship, to ideas of the “American Melting Pot” which celebrated 
individual differences (Becker, 2016). This shift in how Americans viewed their national 
identity, alongside strides in LGBTQ rights, contributed to changes in how gay people were 
seen by certain demographics. Becker writes about the “SLUMPY” audience (Socially Liberal 
Urban Minded Professionals) which fast became a desirable demographic for networks to 
attract because of their trendsetter status and their increased disposable income. This 
market was largely made up of young people, who now saw it as “cool” to be accepting of 
gay people, and saw tolerance of homosexuality as proof that they were a modern, radical 
generation, who had moved on from the culture of their parents:  
Gay material wasn’t only useful for network executives… but also for many viewers 
for whom watching prime-time TV with a gay twist spoke to specific political values 
and offered some a convenient way to establish a “hip” identity. (Becker, 2006, 105) 
Gay content was now a way to indicate that a network was modern and cool, and a way for 
audiences to signal that they too were fashionably liberal minded. Of course, this sentiment 
did not apply to the US public as a whole, but the gay friendly(ier) attitudes of the desirable 
SLUMPY audience provided reason enough for networks to risk showing more gay content 
on their screens. If such a shift in American politics and cultural identification can have such 
an impact on gay representations in the 1990s – with hit sitcoms such as Friends featuring 
gay side characters, and programmes such as Ellen and later Will & Grace foregrounding 
gay leads – it follows that the landmark Marriage Equality legislation, may also have had an 
impact on how networks present gay and lesbian characters in their programming.  
Shifts in how gay and lesbian characters are presented in network television can also be 
attributed to changes in the television landscape in the 2010s. It is important to note that 
whilst the campaign for Marriage Equality intensified, the television industry was also 
reacting to the popularisation of streaming services – particularly Netflix – and their first 
forays into original programming. In much the same way as paid cable channels such as 
HBO and Showtime put pressure on the networks to introduce more socially progressive 
content and take more risks in order to retain their audience share, the early success of 
Netflix’s original programming prompted network television to rethink their approach to 
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both their content and their business model. For example, Netflix’s success with rebooting 
Arrested Development years after the original series was cancelled started a trend in 
nostalgic reboots of old series in network television with new seasons of shows such as The 
X Files, Prison Break, 24, and Heroes, appearing on America’s screens (Jenner, 2018). Will & 
Grace’s new season falls into this trend, with networks focusing their attention on series 
with built-in audiences to minimise risk and attempt to guarantee a level of commercial 
success.  
The economic model of streaming services also allows for the production of niche content 
with a lower commercial risk, as Netflix discerns a programme’s success from the amount 
of new service users it generates, rather than focusing solely on individual views. Streaming 
services are also free from advertiser interference, so are more able to take bigger risks 
with their content to appeal to niche audiences who may not see themselves represented 
on network television. The critical and commercial success of Orange Is the New Black, and 
the critical lauding of its focus on black and Latina women, queer women, and the lower 
class – characters who were not often featured on network or prestige television – 
contributed to Netflix’s branding as a home for diverse content. Faced with the threat that 
the streaming boom may pull viewers away from traditional ways of viewing television, by 
offering more representation, alongside freedom and choice to watch whenever and 
wherever one wants, the networks increased diversity in their programming by including 
more gay and lesbian characters, as well as prioritising racial diversity in casting and 
programming. This is important to keep in mind whilst examining the changes in gay and 
lesbian representation on network television during the 2010s. 
I will argue that the impact of Marriage Equality legislation can be seen in the ways in 
which network television presents gay and lesbian happiness. Networks find themselves in 
the position of having to include gay and lesbian characters in their programming – to draw 
in gay audiences and maintain their relevance in modern culture – and of having to present 
those characters as something other than the tragic stereotypes of the 60s, 70s and 80s. 
Networks must find a way to include gay characters enough to appeal to young audiences 
who demand diversity from their programming, bring in the “pink pound” to their 
advertisers and lend their shows a sense of cultural cache, present those characters as 
“positive” enough for lobby groups such as GLAAD to approve of their programming, but 
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also avoid presenting those characters as “too gay”2 so that conservative audiences don’t 
change the channel, and conservative advertisers don’t pull their funding. Networks have 
to find a way to make gay characters acceptable to audiences across the USA, including 
those who hold socially conservative views. I will argue that Marriage Equality provided the 
perfect solution to this problem, allowing networks to present a neoliberal version of gay 
happiness, which falls in line with existing American values and therefore poses no threat 
to heteronormative institutions, or conservatively minded audiences.  
I use Duggan’s account of “homonormativity” to explore how marriage is used by network 
television to allow for happy representations of gay and lesbian characters on its 
programmes. I position network television as neoliberal, which leads it to condemn anti-
gay sentiments and reject gay radicalism in equal measure. It pushes gay characters into 
homonormative structures, with an aim to assimilating gay characters into straight 
narratives, rather than exploring and celebrating gayness in and of itself. I argue that this 
prizing of homonormativity, and its reinforced connections with happiness, works to 
placate the LGBTQ rights movement, and perpetuate the narrative of Marriage Equality as 
a happy ending, papering over the continual problems that gay and lesbian Americans still 
face.  
I have chosen to focus on four network television programmes which featured gay and 
lesbian characters and same sex marriages in the lead up to and after the Supreme Court 
decision on Marriage Equality. I have chosen these programmes – Glee, Grey’s Anatomy, 
How to Get Away with Murder, and the 2018 revival series of Will & Grace – because they 
represent a wide range of networks and genres. Glee is a musical comedy drama which 
aired on the conservative owned Fox network and was aimed towards a teen or young 
adult audience. Medical drama Grey’s Anatomy and soapy legal thriller How to Get Away 
with Murder air on ABC which is owned by Disney, and are aimed towards a female market. 
Will & Grace is a classic half hour, multi-camera sitcom which airs on the more liberal 
branded network NBC. By using a breadth of works which cross genres and channels, I hope 
to show that my findings are specific to network television as a whole, rather than to any 
specific genre or channel. 
                                                          
2 When NBC cancelled Ellen, their reasoning was not that she was gay but that she- and the 
programme were “too gay”. Then CEO Robert Iger is quoted as saying “It became a programme 
about a lead character who was gay every single week. And I just think that was too much for 
people” (Brady, Burns & Davies, 2018, 20-21) 
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In Chapter One, I focus on the connections between happiness, marriage and happy 
endings, drawing from Ahmed’s explanation of happiness as a social construct, used by a 
patriarchal, heteronormative society to keep its citizens following the same paths and 
working towards the same goals. I discuss how happiness and endings are linked, analysing 
how Will & Grace retracted the happy endings of its characters from its original series in 
order to reboot the show and continue their storylines. I also look at how Glee used 
marriage as a happy ending for its gay and lesbian characters in its final season and how 
the episode’s political overtones contributed to the construction of Marriage Equality as a 
happy ending for the LGBT rights movement.  
In Chapter Two, I analyse two representations of marriage and weddings from Grey’s 
Anatomy – the same sex marriage of Callie and Arizona, and the starkly different portrayal 
of marriage seen in the almost wedding of Christina and Burke. I again employ Ahmed’s 
work to position Callie as the queer child attempting to prove to her parents that her 
bisexuality can coincide with their heterosexually sanctioned ideals of happiness. I contrast 
this portrayal of a wedding as a uniquely happy event, with the failed wedding of Christina 
and Burke to show that the connections made between weddings, marriage and happiness 
are often restricted to a programme’s gay and lesbian characters, with weddings often 
being employed as a source of drama and conflict for a programme’s heterosexual couples.  
In Chapter Three, I interrogate the differences between gayness and queerness and 
examine whether former representations of tragic gay characters on television have been 
replaced by tragic queer characters, referring to both Tropiano’s and Becker’s work which 
provide historical context of gay and lesbian visibility on television. I use Goltz’s concept of 
the “good gay” to discuss whether the bonds between marriage, happiness and 
homonormativity, tie queerness to unhappiness and therefore promote conformity and 
assimilation as routes to happiness and salvation.  
Finally, in Chapter Four I will examine how the shift in US politics towards a far right 
ideology and the resulting uncertainty for the LGBTQ community in the Trump era, disrupts 
the concept of Marriage Equality as a happy ending, and can be connected to the increase 
in political engagement from formerly apolitical network television programmes. I will 
again draw from Ahmed to discuss how queer unhappiness can act as an impetus for social 
change, and how it is therefore important for representations of queer unhappiness to be 




Chapter One: Marriage, Happiness and Happy Endings 
This chapter examines the concept of happiness, how happiness is tied to endings and how 
marriage has become linked to the idea of a happy ending in narratives, on television, and 
in society. I outline Sara Ahmed’s work on happiness and focus on how marriage has been 
used as an end point for characters on network television. I examine how the use of 
marriage to signify a happy ending for same sex characters on network television mirrors 
the homonormative idea that the legalisation of same sex marriage may mark an end to 
the LGBTQ rights movement, providing a “happily ever after” for both fictional and real life 
gays and lesbians. I discuss how the revival series of Will & Grace dismantled its character’s 
happy endings in order to bring the series back to the screen, and how Glee used same sex 
marriage to end the storylines of all of its gay and lesbian characters in one episode of its 
final season. Ultimately, I will establish a link between happiness, endings and marriage, 
and discuss how this link is seen in network gay and lesbian representations, in a post 
marriage equality USA.  
In her work The Promise of Happiness, Sara Ahmed explores the concept of happiness as a 
cultural construction, as a performative action or elusive incentive for social conformity 
rather than any kind of immutable good or universally felt emotion. For Ahmed, happiness 
– and the prescriptive obsession with attaining happiness – acts as a form of social 
pressure, orienting citizens towards certain culturally acceptable goals and maintaining a 
communal façade of “okay-ness” as people strive to reach a point of happiness within their 
lives, whilst also refusing to admit they are not already happy.  
Ahmed pinpoints three components to the concept of happiness:  
Happiness involves affect (to be happy is to be affected by something), intentionality 
(to be happy is to be happy about something), and evaluation or judgement (to be 
happy about something makes something good). If happiness creates its objects, 
then such objects are passed around, accumulating positive affective value as social 
goods. (2010, 22) 
Here happiness is tied with goodness, as being happy about something, or having been 
made happy by something, in turn ascribes a moral goodness onto that object, and 
assumes that it will then make others happy in the same way. In this way, society values 
certain actions as happiness causing, and therefore as “good”. Ahmed describes this 
process as circular:  
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Certain objects are attributed as the cause of happiness, which means they already 
circulate as social goods before we “happen” upon them, which is why we might 
happen upon them in the first place. (2010, 28) 
Instead of finding their own happiness by chance, people pursue that which society has 
determined will make them happy. Individuals may already predict what will cause their 
happiness before they encounter it themselves. Happiness then becomes directed, 
orienting people towards specific, culturally designated goals with the promise of fulfilment 
once those goals are attained. This creates a communal agreement on what brings 
happiness, an agreement which is difficult to break for fear of shattering the happiness 
illusion.  
Ahmed also describes happiness as directional: “When we follow things we aim for 
happiness, as if happiness is what you get if you reach certain points” (2010, 26). People 
spend their lives seeking out what will make them happy, whether that be physical objects; 
food, clothes, books; activities; exercise, sex, travel; or states of being; parenthood, love, 
financial stability. Happiness, then, is a goal, a target to aim one’s life towards, and a fuel, 
an incentive to push people to reach those goals. Happiness works as both the carrot and 
the stick, moving people to where they think they want to be.  
In her chapter on The Unhappy Queer, Ahmed describes these “happiness scripts” as 
“straightening devices, ways of aligning bodies with what is already lined up” (2010, 91). In 
this way happiness is not only directional but also directive. Happiness tells people what to 
do with their lives and how to spend their time. Individuals follow happiness wherever it 
takes them, and assume that where it takes them is for the best. Happiness is associated 
with goodness, an action that makes someone happy must be a good action. Certain 
actions are shown to cause happiness in others so they must cause happiness in oneself. 
Certain happiness scripts are tied to the idea of living a good life – marriage, children, and 
financial success – and a life without those milestones is feared as a life that must be 
fundamentally unhappy.  
If then, happiness is tied with goodness, then unhappiness is tied to badness. A life which 
does not follow the standard happiness scripts is unhappy, and therefore bad. People do 
not want to live a bad life, therefore they must follow the instructions for happiness. This 
mechanism ensures people follow a set of rules for their lives which comply with the status 
quo, encouraging people to follow the same paths as everyone who came before them. 
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Happiness secures conformity, demanding an adherence to the rules for fear of admitting 
one’s unhappiness, one’s badness. 
Ahmed’s description of happiness as a “straightening device” also points to happiness as a 
tool of heteronormativity. Happiness straightens, not only towards the status quo – 
towards capitalism and societal norms – but also towards a kind of straightness that is 
implicit in that status quo – that of heterosexuality. Happiness scripts – ways of generating 
happiness – line up to heterosexual social values. Ahmed points to marriage as “one of the 
primary happiness indicators” in the introduction to The Promise of Happiness: 
Marriage would be defined as “the best of all possible worlds” as it maximises 
happiness. The argument is simple: if you are married, then we can predict that you 
are more likely to be happier than if you are not married. The finding is also a 
recommendation: get married and you will be happier! (2010, 6)  
As referenced in my introduction, marriage provides legal, financial, and social benefits to 
those who participate in it, therefore reinforcing the idea of marriage as a cause of 
happiness. Traditionally, marriage has also been reserved for heterosexual couples, 
generating an image of the celebration of heterosexual love and commitment over that of 
same sex couples or polyamorous arrangements. Marriage and heterosexuality are 
inextricably linked, so when directed towards marriage as a happiness indicator we are also 
directed towards heterosexuality. The recommendation “get married and you will be 
happier!” can also be read as “be heterosexual and you will be happier!” In this way, 
happiness directs us towards straightness, and therefore away from queerness. Queerness 
becomes the state of unhappiness we aim to escape from by achieving heterosexuality, by 
straightening, and attaining happiness.  
This scepticism of marriage as a happiness bringer is echoed in Lisa Duggan’s work on “The 
New Homonormativity”, in which Duggan criticises the neoliberal leanings of the 
mainstream LGBTQ rights movement and its laser focus on marriage rights. This criticism 
shares its roots with Ahmed’s work in doubting the connections between marriage and 
happiness. Duggan too identifies the risks in embracing happiness, and eschewing 
unhappiness. Where Ahmed sees a recommendation of “get married and you will be 
happier!”, Duggan sees a resignation of “go[ing] home and cook[ing] dinner, forever” 
(2002, 189). Duggan’s “new homonormativity” is in many ways the result of Ahmed’s 
construction of happiness as a “straightening device”. For Duggan, the prioritisation of 
marriage as a source of gay and lesbian happiness is tantamount to a placation of gay and 
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lesbian anger, and a de-queering of the movement – an argument which Ahmed explores in 
her chapter on “The Unhappy Queer”. I explore Duggan’s work further in chapter two, but 
will herein use her term “homonormative”  to refer to gay and lesbian constructs that 
mirror those of heteronormative society, or in other ways bolster the aspirational nature of 
heterosexual paradigms for gay and lesbian individuals. 
After the Supreme Court decision on Marriage Equality in 2015, marriage was no longer 
only reserved for heterosexual relationships. Marriage – and its many benefits- became 
accessible across the US for same sex couples, allowing them to be directed towards 
happiness in the same way as heterosexual couples. In the statement on the ruling from 
Obergefell vs Hodges, the Supreme Court stated: 
From their beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal 
the transcendent importance of marriage. The lifelong union of a man and a woman 
always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their 
station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers 
unique fulfilment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows 
two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes 
greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage 
is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations. 
(Obergefell v Hodges, 2015) 
Same-sex couples won the right to marry in part because of marriage’s relationship to 
happiness. The Supreme Court was not only granting gay people the right to marry, but 
also the right to nobility, dignity and hope through marriage. The presumption here is that, 
because marriage has often brought happiness to heterosexual couples, homosexual 
people must be afforded access to that happiness in the same way. There is no reference to 
divorce, to domestic violence, to arranged or forced marriages, or any other of the myriad 
of ways that marriage may in fact bring unhappiness. Marriage is instead categorised as a 
happiness bringer, so to continue denying marriage to same sex couples would be 
tantamount to denying gay people the right to happiness itself.  
With marriage defined as a bringer of happiness, happiness is also tied to the idea of a life 
goal, of a milestone, of something to aim for. The Declaration of Independence declares the 
USA to be committed to the idea that its citizens are endowed with the god given rights to 
lifce, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The US was founded not on the right to 
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happiness itself, but on the right to pursue it. Americans are not existing in a state of 
happiness, rather they are chasing it. In order to be in pursuit of happiness, one must 
currently not be in possession of it. One must be unhappy.  
If the state of happiness requires unhappiness to exist, it also requires us to eschew 
unhappiness in favour of the pursuit of happiness. Working towards happiness means 
working away from unhappiness. Unhappiness becomes a starting point for improvement. 
If unhappiness is the start then happiness must be the end.  
Happiness and endings are linked both culturally and narratively. The phrase “happily ever 
after”, learned in childhood from fairy tales and story books, gives an idea of happiness as 
everlasting once it has been attained. Happiness is for “ever”. The state of happiness, once 
achieved is permanent. We need no further explanation of a story’s ending; the characters 
are happy and continue to be so, presumably for the rest of their lives. Once happiness is 
secured, it becomes a safe state of being where unhappiness cannot reappear. A happy 
ending provides happiness for life.  
Happiness is also “after”. Happiness is what one gets when one finishes. It comes after, but 
after what? After unhappiness, after struggle, after the story. Happiness must be the end, 
so that “happily ever” can be “after”. It cannot be after if the story continues and it cannot 
be forever if the story keeps going. A happy ending signifies the end of a struggle, the end 
of disruption. Happiness lasts forever after the story ends because for there to be a story 
there must be disruption, there must be a break in the equilibrium, and this is incompatible 
with happiness.  
Happiness here is again linked with marriage, as many of the stories, fairy tales and 
folklores which popularised the phrase “happily ever after” also end with a wedding. In 
these stories, marriage – or a marriage symbolised by a wedding – indicates that the 
heroine’s hardships are now over, that she is free of the troubles that plagued her during 
the story, and will now be happy forever. 
In television, narrative conventions are in built into genres, and the happy ending is a 
common feature in network schedules. For example, a sitcom is recognisable by its 
recurring characters, comical misunderstandings and guarantee of a happy ending: 
No matter the conflict, resolution and a return to happiness were guaranteed: each 
week the narrative would return the characters to the same situation and frame of 
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mind with which they began – they would learn nothing new, and would neither 
change nor grow. (Henry, 2003, 265)  
In each episode of a sitcom, equilibrium is disrupted, causing conflict which is later 
resolved. This structure extends to the series as a whole, ensuring that the ending of a 
sitcom will always be a happy one. This happiness is often signified by a wedding, or at 
least the coming together of the central “will they won’t they” couple (presuming the 
series is allowed to end on its own terms). These genre conventions further tie marriage to 
the idea of a happy ending, and are often a feature of network television (Mills, 2005). 
Friends for example, ensured that all of its characters were either married, or on their way 
to being married by the end of its final season, giving Phoebe a magical outdoor wedding to 
Mike, and reuniting Ross and Rachel. The obvious exception here is Joey, who remains 
single at the end of the finale, ready to continue to pursue his happiness in his eponymous 
spin off.  
That said, weddings – as a symbols of marriage – are often employed as sources of drama 
or conflict, more so in some genres than others. In soap opera for example, the audience 
knows that during any episode featuring a wedding, something is bound to go wrong – a 
character may interrupt the ceremony, someone may be jilted at the altar, a secret may be 
revealed which threatens the couple’s relationship, and in many cases, a character may die. 
However, this use of a wedding as the setting for melodrama in some ways reinforces the 
connection between marriage and happiness. The soap opera trope of a wedding gone 
wrong works precisely because weddings are expected to be happy events. The drama is 
caused by the disruption of this happiness, by the undermining of expectations. 
Friends also featured episodes where weddings and marriages went wrong. In fact, the 
series’ “situation” is borne out of a failed wedding, with Rachel leaving her fiancé at the 
altar and running into Monica and the rest of the gang in her wedding dress. Also 
foregrounded in the pilot episode is Ross’ failed marriage to Carol who has left him for 
another woman. Ross’ inability to succeed in marriage is a running joke in the series, with 
him marrying and divorcing several times. In The One with Phoebe’s Husband the friends 
discover that Phoebe is married to a gay Canadian ice dancer who needed a Green Card. 
The episode centres around his request for a divorce because he has since realised that he 
is in fact not gay, and wants to marry another woman. Ross’ wedding to Emily is disastrous, 
with all of their plans falling through and their venue in the process of being demolished. 
Ross’ attempts to save the wedding almost pay off, before he says Rachel’s name in his 
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vows instead of Emily’s. These unsuccessful weddings and broken marriages create conflict 
for the characters, and comedic moments for the audience, but ultimately pave the way for 
the characters to find their true happiness in marrying “the right person”. Ross and Emily’s 
wedding had to go wrong in order for Ross and Rachel to reconcile in the end. The various 
weddings throughout the series are used as road blocks to extend the “will they won’t 
they” storyline until the final season, so that Ross and Rachel can live happily ever after.  
Will & Grace’s initial eight season run, which frequently aired alongside Friends in NBC’s 
famous Thursday night “Must See TV” line-up, also focused on a group of friends living in 
New York City and trying to find love. Will & Grace also starts with a central female 
character rejecting a marriage, as Grace is proposed to by her boyfriend but ultimately 
turns him down. The eight seasons after this show Will and Grace entering into various 
relationships which inevitably fail, until the final season where the two main characters 
either get married or settle into a committed relationship. In the series finale, a flash-
forward  showed Grace, married to long standing “will they, won’t they” love interest Leo, 
and Will, in a committed long term relationship with partner Vince, raising children 
together who decades later meet at college and are set up as love interests themselves. 
Karen and Jack also end up in a kind of marriage, living together with Karen’s long suffering 
maid Rosario. This ending ensured audiences knew that Will and Grace’s lives after the 
programme ended were happy ones, showing viewers that both characters found long 
lasting love, had children, and ultimately remained good friends. By implying a romantic 
relationship between Will and Grace’s respective children, the programme also provided a 
sense of closure to the show’s concept – that Will and Grace would make the perfect 
couple, if it weren’t for Will’s homosexuality. This aspect of the series finale implied that at 
least a part of Will and Grace would finally get together in the end.  
The season finale of Will & Grace aired in 2006, nine years before Marriage Equality was 
achieved in the US. In 2018, three years after Obergefell vs Hodges, the programme 
returned to NBC with a revival series, starring the same cast over a decade later. This 
revival series used the cold open of its pilot to erase the events of the 2006 finale, in order 
to set its characters back to similar starting points as they were in the first series. In this, 
Karen wakes from a drunken daydream and is told by Will, Grace and Jack that Grace never 
had Will’s baby, Will never raised a child with Vince, and all of this was just a product of her 
intoxicated imagination.  
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Karen: What happened to the children you had who grew up and got married to each 
other? 
Will: That never happened. 
Karen: What a relief! No one wants to see you two raise kids! 
Jack: Yeah, what would be funny about that? 
(Will & Grace: 11 Years Later, 2018) 
During this exchange Karen and Jack spell out for the audience the decision to wipe certain 
parts of the previous finale’s narrative from existence. The line “No one wants to see you 
two raise kids” works as an in character barb from Karen about Will and Grace’s lack of 
parenting skills, and as a meta comment about a perceived lack of interest in a “Will and 
Grace as parents” storyline. This is further underlined by Jack’s “What would be funny 
about that?” emphasising the difficulty the show might have in finding humour in what is 
generally seen as a happy state of being.  
This “meta” approach continues later in the scene when Will gives Karen a brief summing 
up of events: 
Will: You’re rich. Stan’s alive. Both single. No kids. 
(Will & Grace: 11 Years Later, 2018) 
Jack then looks directly into the camera, breaking the fourth wall and speaks directly to 
Grace (who has been tasked with taking a candid photo at an opportune moment) and the 
audience: 
Jack: Got it? 
(Will & Grace: 11 Years Later, 2018) 
(See Fig.1) 
Through thinly disguising this moment of audience instruction, the show manages to 
explain away the absurdity of wiping previous events from history with a knowing nod and 
wink to its viewers. Instead of working in realistic plot events to counteract the events of 
the 2006 finale, the revival chooses to retract them completely, in its own version of “it was 
all a dream”. Jack’s comment to camera draws attention to their moment of rewriting 
history, assuring audiences that Will & Grace respects their intelligence, and that the show 
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knows what they want to see from Will & Grace – a comedy about two single friends, not a 
family comedy about raising children.  
Whereas Will and Grace’s children are erased from existence entirely, both Will’s 
relationship with Vince and Grace’s marriage to Leo are upheld. The programme resets 
these aspects of the finale by explaining that Will’s relationship doesn’t work out (later 
attributed to Vince’s unwillingness to get married), and Grace and Leo got divorced. Whilst 
the breakdown of these relationships does to some extent shatter the illusion that a happy 
ending, once achieved, lasts forever, this turn of events does now allow the characters to 
work towards that happy ending once again. The audience is able to see the happiness Will 
had with Vince and Grace had with Leo as something other than the true happiness 
suggested at the end of the series’ first iteration. Instead these relationships are positioned 
as temporary, and therefore not truly happy. By ending these relationships, Will & Grace 
gives its characters the ability to work towards true happiness again, and gives the 
audience the pleasure of watching them repeatedly, comically fail to achieve it.  
By pushing the reset button on Will and Grace’s lives, the programme is able to place the 
characters back to much the same place as the first series started. Will and Grace are still 
living together (after Grace suffers a break-up), trying to find love and struggling to find a 
relationship that lives up to the bond they have with each other. This sets the characters 
back to a place of striving towards happiness, placing happiness again at the end point, as a 
driving force behind the character’s actions and as something for them to work towards. 
This is specifically significant for Will’s storyline, as he is now – after Marriage Equality - 
able to aspire towards marriage.  
In Will & Grace we see that happiness can only be reserved for an ending; the story has 
been continued so the happy ending must be debunked and written off as a fiction. 
Happiness and story are incompatible to such an extent that in order to continue telling 
this story, their previous ending, and their previous happiness must be not only written out 
of existence, but also ridiculed as absurd. It never happened and it could never have 
happened. To believe it is ridiculous, so ridiculous in fact that even the characters 
themselves must speak through the screen to confirm the audience has ridden it from their 
minds.  As Will and Grace’s happy endings were signified by their success in finding a 
romantic partner with whom to spend the rest of their lives – Grace as happily married, and 
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Will in a long term committed relationship – this incompatibility also extends to marriage3. 
By insinuating that a story about Will and Grace being happily married would have been 
unwatchable, Will & Grace also implies that the characters could not have been unhappily 
married either. Instead of choosing to find humour and conflict within the characters’ 
relationships - in Grace and Leo’s path to divorce, or Will and Vince’s arguing over whether 
or not to get married - the revival series starts after these relationships have failed – 
preserving the connections between marriage, happiness and endings. 
During the lead up to the Supreme Court’s decision on Marriage Equality, this connection 
between marriage and happy endings became especially significant for gay and lesbian 
characters on television, with some programmes using their gay and lesbian characters to 
make political statements in support of legalising same sex marriage. One of these 
programmes was Ryan Murphy’s Glee, which despite airing on the famously conservative 
Fox network, featured several gay, lesbian, bisexual and trans characters in its changing line 
up over its six seasons. In Glee’s 2015 final season, all four of its central gay and lesbian 
characters get married in the same episode. A Wedding focuses on the upcoming nuptials 
of Brittany and Santana and the various preparations for the ceremony. They are getting 
married not in their home state of Ohio, but across the state border into Indiana where 
same sex marriage is legal. During the episode, the programme’s other gay couple, Kurt 
and Blaine, reconcile after a brief separation, and are later convinced to get married at the 
same time as Brittany and Santana, in a double gay wedding. 
A Wedding aired in February 2015, around four months before same sex marriage was 
legalised across the US. The episode is clearly making a pro- marriage equality statement – 
there are various speeches throughout about the importance of marriage for everyone, 
about how brave both the couples are, and a smaller storyline featuring Santana’s religious 
grandmother overcoming her prejudices to attend the ceremony – and the episode’s 
historical context serves to reinforce this message. In contrast, another storyline during the 
episode features socially awkward Tina deciding to propose to her ex-boyfriend Mike, 
despite them no longer being in a relationship. The idea is ridiculed as absurd, with her 
friends sceptical of her logic. Her proposal is rejected, and she realises this absurdity for 
herself. The programme positions this storyline as comic relief, the audience are supposed 
                                                          
3 One can assume that if same sex marriage had been legal in 2008, Will and Vince would also have 
married, though it is interesting to note that in the flash forward to Will and Grace’s future, Will and 
Vince remain unmarried. The idea of same sex marriage becoming a reality is not even conceived of, 
even far enough into the future for Will and Grace’s kids to be at college together.  
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to see Tina’s idea as silly and desperate, despite the fact that Kurt and Blaine end up doing 
the exact thing she proposes. The gay couple’s decision to marry on the spur of the 
moment after a period of separation is exalted as brave and romantically spontaneous. All 
of their friends are wholly supportive and the adults in their life encourage them – despite 
every character still being in their late teens. For the straight teenage girl, marriage is a silly 
whim, a decision she’s far too young and naïve to make, and something which will never 
work out. This double standard reinforces the idea of marriage as a happiness marker for 
gay characters– a way of showing audiences that gay people can escape their queer 
unhappiness and move towards a homonormative happiness. By presenting the idea of 
Tina marrying Mike as ridiculous, but Kurt and Blaine’s decision to marry as a sincere 
expression of their commitment and an unquestionably positive decision, supported by 
both parties’ parents, Glee shows that whereas marriage may not be the right choice for 
every straight couple, it must always be the right choice for gay couples.  
Marriage for Glee provides a happy ending for all of its gay characters, all at once. In the 
five subsequent episodes of the series, the gay characters rarely feature, with the other 
heterosexual characters from the ensemble taking centre stage. Santana, Brittany, Kurt and 
Blaine’s stories are concluded by their weddings. This not only a further reification of the 
ties between marriage, happiness and endings, but also gestures towards the 
homonormative concept of access to marriage providing a happy ending for the LGBTQ 
rights movement as a whole. Assimilative approaches to LGBTQ rights, described by 
Duggan as homonormative and neoliberal, saw access to existing institutions, such as 
marriage, as the main goal of the LGBTQ rights movement. (Becker, 2006) (Haider-Markel & 
Miller, 2017). Many of the arguments used in favour of marriage equality, focused on the 
access it would give gay people to happiness rather than to financial or practical benefits, 
making use of slogans such as “love is love” and “love wins” to foreground the romantic 
aspects of marriage over its legality. Access to marriage would provide gay and lesbian 
couples the chance to have their own version of “happily ever after”, therefore achieving 
marriage equality would provide a happy ending to decades of struggle for the LGBTQ 
movement. By explicitly, repeatedly politicising the marriages of Brittany and Santana, and 
Kurt and Blaine, Glee aligns its gay characters’ happy endings with that of the whole LGBTQ 
community. During both couples’ wedding vows, each individuals’ struggles with 
homophobic bullying, self-loathing and isolation are mentioned, emphasising that marriage 
is both the reward they get for surviving queer unhappiness, and their path out of that 
unhappiness. Glee’s decision to marry both couples in order to provide them a happy 
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ending, implies that marriage is the only way to indicate happiness for those couples. It is 
not enough to merely reconcile Kurt and Blaine, they must get married to show that they 
will stay together forever.  
Happiness is socially constructed, reinforced by circular directivity, pointing people towards 
what will bring them happiness based on the assumption that what makes others happy 
will make everyone happy. Individuals may follow these happiness scripts in order to 
achieve what is socially considered to be a good life. One such happiness script is marriage, 
which has been tied to the idea of a happy ending throughout narrative history, the two 
remaining linked in modern network television. The link between marriage and happiness 
was a strong influence in the Supreme Court’s decision to legalise same sex marriage, and 
the effects of this can be seen in network representations of gay and lesbian characters. In 
Will & Grace, a happy ending involving marriage is scrubbed from memory in order to 
revive the series and allow for characters to chase happiness once again. In Glee, the need 
to provide the series’ gay characters a happy ending coincided with the run up to the 
Supreme Court’s decision, and resulted in a double gay wedding of four teenagers who 
wholly believed that marriage was the solution to all of their gay problems. In my next 
chapter I further explore the concept of same-sex marriage as a cure-all for homophobia, 














Chapter Two: Same Sex Marriage as a Homonormative Happy Ending 
This chapter discusses the connection between happiness, same sex marriage and 
homonormativity, and how marriage equality, positioned as a landmark achievement for 
the LGBTQ rights movement, is indicative of an adherence to neoliberal ideals and tactics. I 
expand on the work of Lisa Duggan and explore her definition of homonormativity, 
specifically relating to same sex marriage. I also contextualise network television in relation 
to Duggan’s explanation of neoliberalism, arguing that networks – because of their specific 
economic model – are themselves neoliberal and that these politics can then be seen in 
their content as well as their business practices. Following this I discuss how same sex 
marriage’s use in network television as a happy ending for its gay characters perpetuates a 
neoliberal, homonormative approach to gay representation, and how the link between 
marriage and happiness is employed to present marriage as a solution to gay problems4. In 
order to exemplify this I focus specifically on the wedding of Callie and Arizona in medical 
drama Grey’s Anatomy and compare the representation of their same sex marriage seen in  
Season 11’s White Wedding and the representations of heterosexual marriage shown in 
both White Wedding  and Season 3 episode Didn’t We Almost Have It All? . I continue to 
draw upon the work of Sara Ahmed, alongside Duggan and Goltz’s concept of “good gays” 
and the “heteronormative court”. I explore how the construction of marriage as a happy 
ending has become specifically tied to gay and lesbian characters on network television as 
opposed to their heterosexual counterparts, and how this relationship reinforces a 
shameful narrative of homosexuality, implying that homonormativity is the only route to 
happiness.  
Lisa Duggan’s essay “The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism” 
outlines the connection between neoliberal politics and the assimilation tactics used by 
centrist gay and lesbian activist groups. She describes the approach of these groups, such 
as the IGF (Independent Gay Writers Forum) - as an attempt to mainstream gayness, and 
eschew intersectional concerns such as racism, poverty and classism, in favour of a de-
radicalised approach to gay rights focused on gaining access to culturally entrenched 
institutions, rather than dismantling them. Duggan argues that the concept of 
neoliberalism, often thought of as solely economic in its reach, has in fact influenced 
cultural and sexual politics to perhaps the same extent, and positions assimilationist, 
                                                          
4 Gay problems here refers to problems that one experiences specifically because of one’s 
homosexuality, be that homophobia, violence, denial of services, familial rejection, homelessness or 
struggles with governmental institutions such as difficulty adopting children. 
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centrist gay and lesbian groups as neoliberal through their distinctions of private and 
public, of what is within the realms of government oversight, and what must remain free of 
state interference.  
In his introduction to Noam Chomsky’s Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, 
Robert W. McChesney describes neoliberalism as: 
 the defining political economic paradigm of our time…whereby a relative handful of 
private interests are permitted to control as much as possible of social life in order to 
maximalize their personal profit. (1998, 7) 
A neoliberal perspective prioritises the free market above all else. Social good is seen as 
only producible when capitalism is successful, with the concept of “trickle-down” 
economics reassuring society that as long as the wealthy get wealthier, eventually 
everyone will reap the benefits. McChesney posits that neoliberalism has entrenched itself 
as the only possible form of society by developing a culture of individualism and making 
democracy increasingly difficult to engage with:  
Instead of citizens it [neoliberalism] produces consumers. Instead of communities, it 
produces shopping malls. The net result is an atomized society of disengaged 
individuals who feel demoralized and socially powerless. (1998, 11) 
 
This disengagement is echoed by Duggan, who describes neoliberalism as “a kind of 
nonpolitics – a way of being reasonable” (2002, 117). This approach to politics considers 
itself to be moderate, eschewing the “extremes” of left or right, and instead following a 
“reasonable” middle way. This kind of neoliberal approach gestures towards socially liberal 
ideas whilst adhering to economic conservatism and continuing to uphold free market 
capitalism as the ideal. Duggan rejects this claim of neoliberalism’s apolitical stance, and 
implies that neoliberal theories sit closer to that of right wing conservativism than its 
proponents speak to, specifically due to strategies of “privatisation… the transfer of wealth 
and decision making from public, more-or-less accountable decision-making bodies to 
individual or corporate, unaccountable hands”. (2002, 178) Duggan suggests that neoliberal 
privatisation tactics undermine the movement’s socially liberal credentials and put 
marginalised groups at risk by removing the government’s obligations to protect those who 
may be discriminated against, and categorising previously considered public issues of 
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minority rights and protections, as private matters for which the government takes no 
responsibility.  
One can easily draw parallels between the paradigms of neoliberalism and the space in 
which US television networks exist. Networks must position themselves as between the 
political left and right, ensuring never to stray too far in either direction for fear of turning 
off viewers with contrasting political views. Networks are also privatised capitalist 
institutions, creating television not for the sake of television itself, but to make money. In 
order to make their money, networks must exist in a neoliberal space, creating either 
programming that is superficially apolitical, or enough programming which leans towards 
either side of the political divide to curate an image of the network that remains believably 
neutral. This approach allows networks to draw in advertisers from across the political 
spectrum, and attract cross-demographic audiences across the US to their schedules. This 
neoliberal approach can be seen in the types of programmes commissioned by the 
networks, and in the content of those programmes which is often controlled and censored 
by network executives who are responsible for maintaining their brand’s apolitical image. 
Through this knock-on effect of network television’s economic model into the content of its 
programming, mass market popular culture is directly influenced by neoliberalism, creating 
an impression of what is considered to be politically moderate, whilst in fact still adhering 
to right wing economics. 
Duggan’s article further suggests a link between neoliberal economic politics and shifts in 
cultural and sexual politics. She posits that neoliberalism rejects identity politics, in favour 
of a view of humanity as a homogenised mass, fuelling capitalism and living their own, 
individual, private lives. For neoliberals whether a person is gay or straight is irrelevant, as 
long as they contribute to the free market economy: 
[The new homonormativity] is a politics that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions but upholds and sustains them while 
promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatised, 
depoliticised gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption. (2002, 179) 
For neoliberal LGBTQ activist groups, gay and lesbian rights are less about challenging 
heteronormativity, or questioning a world which privileges heterosexuality, and more 
about gaining the opportunity to participate in capitalism in the same way as heterosexual 
citizens. Equality here is less about the right to be one’s authentic gay or lesbian self 
without fear of discrimination – personal or economic – and more about the right to 
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conform, to be “just like everybody else”. This approach is a practical one, allowing gay and 
lesbian rights groups to form a connection to the mainstream, aligning themselves with 
American values of capitalism and privacy, and reassuring the heterosexual majority that 
the LGBTQ community does not pose a threat to the heteronormative power structure. 
Duggan describes this approach as “a double voiced address to an imagined gay public, on 
the one hand, and to the national mainstream constructed by neoliberalism on the other” 
(2002, 179). This tactic may allow for increased mainstream support of gay rights issues, 
but it does so through assuming that every gay person wants to be part of the mainstream. 
This “imagined gay public” leaves little space for those who do not want to conform, or 
those who cannot conform. It makes no allowances for the ways in which intersectional 
identities may prove barriers to the mainstream, for those gay and lesbian people who are 
black, Asian or Hispanic, for those living in poverty, for the disabled or for trans people. Not 
only are these people left out of the benefits of a neoliberal approach to gay and lesbian 
rights, they are also left out of the picture of an LGBTQ community that neoliberal activism 
groups want to present to the mainstream. Instead these identities are erased in favour of 
white, middle class, affluent and cis-gendered characters, whose only barrier to 
participating in capitalism is their homosexuality. By positioning gay rights as a simple 
domestic privacy issue, rather than a civil rights issue, groups such as the IGF hoped to 
depoliticise the concept of gay equality, making it more palatable for those on both sides of 
the aisle. The discussion was no longer about tearing down institutions or demanding 
governmental interventions to secure access, or provide special interest group status. It 
was now less of a fight for recognition, and more of a polite request to stay unrecognised, 
to keep one’s private life private and to be able to live life like any other heterosexual 
American.  
Duggan is wary that this oversimplification of gay politics and its worship of conservative 
institutions in fact works against the LGBTQ rights movement: 
There is no vision of a collective, democratic public culture or of an ongoing 
engagement with contentious, cantankerous queer politics. Instead we have been 
administered a kind of political sedative – we get marriage and the military then we 
go home and cook dinner, forever. (2002, 189) 
By providing access to heteronormative institutions, homonormativity acts as a form of 
placation, masking the need for more radical queer politics, and encouraging gay and 
lesbian individuals to settle down their tempers, and settle down into private, 
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homonormative family life. By prioritising access to institutions such as marriage, 
neoliberalism reinforces the connections between marriage and happiness, and between 
same sex marriage and an ending to gay and lesbian struggle. Duggan’s “political sedative” 
suggests that the aligning of LGBTQ equality with marriage rights, is in fact a deliberate 
political ploy, intended to keep gay and lesbian people from challenging the status quo by 
making space for them within it. 
By prioritising marriage equality as a central goal of the gay and lesbian rights movement, 
homonormativity not only categorises marriage as the happy ending to all gay and lesbian 
troubles, but also positions the gay and lesbian community as one which aspires towards 
heterosexual institutions and therefore heterosexuality itself. This valorising of 
heterosexuality, reifies the binary opposition of heterosexual as good and aspirational, and 
homosexual as bad and shameful. Dustin Bradley Goltz uses the concept of a heterosexual 
courtroom to illustrate how assimilation tactics work against gay rights: 
The rhetorical move of pleading normalcy to the heteronormative court seeks to 
claim access for some gay men within heteronormative temporal scripts, asserting a 
“good gay” model that continues the tragic punishment of those who fail, refuse, or 
cannot adopt normative and assimilationist performance. In short, bridging devices 
work to support and uphold heteronormative mandates, rather than problematize 
and interrogate heteronormativity’s corrupt and oppressive authority. (2010, 84)   
By accessing marriage in order to prove their normalcy, gay people reify the homophobic 
assumption that straightness is the ultimate goal, and that through emulating heterosexual 
structures gay people are able to be as close to the straight dream as possible. Rather than 
queering marriage, marriage equality straightens gayness, acting again as Ahmed’s 
“straightening device”, encouraging gay and lesbian individuals to toe not only a capitalist, 
traditionalist line, but also a heterosexual one.  
This use of marriage equality as a tool of neoliberal homonormativity can be seen in 
medical drama Grey’s Anatomy, which boasted the longest running same-sex couple in 
network television in characters Callie Torres and Arizona Robbins. Grey’s told Callie’s 
coming out story over several seasons as she realised she was bisexual and started dating 
other women, but it is her relationship with out lesbian Arizona that prompts Callie to 
come out to her parents and triggers a storyline which exemplifies network representations 
of homonormativity. Callie’s parents are deeply religious and she encounters a long term 
struggle with her father Carlos over his refusal to accept her sexuality. In season five 
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episode Sweet Surrender, Callie’s father cuts her off both financially and personally when 
she refuses to return home with him so that he can help straighten her out. Carlos returns 
again in the season six episode Invasion, this time with the family priest in tow in order to 
try and “pray away the gay”. It is in this episode that talk of marriage for Callie and Arizona 
is first brought up, not between the two women, but during Callie’s reconciliation with her 
father: 
Carlos: Listen, if this works out, between you and Arizona, is there a chance that 
             maybe you’d give your mother a wedding?  
Callie: If Arizona wanted to spend the rest of her life with me, yeah, I’ll put on a big  
            white dress and dance down the aisle.  
Carlos: How about grandkids.  
Callie: Yes. I would imagine, when the time came, there would be kids.  
Carlos: Does she make you happy? 
Callie: Yes dad, she makes me very happy.  
(Grey’s Anatomy: Invasion: 2009) 
Here Carlos’ acceptance of his daughter’s sexuality is dependent on her commitment to a 
future wedding. This is not for her, not to celebrate her relationship or formalise a 
commitment, but instead for her mother, to make her mother happy. The phrase “give 
your mother a wedding”, is also here specifically referring to the wedding ceremony, not 
even to a marriage, as Callie had previously eloped with a man – George – earlier in the 
series. Carlos and his wife’s happiness is dependant not necessarily on a marriage but on a 
wedding, not on the institutional concept of government and religion recognised 
commitment, but on the symbolic performance of that commitment. Callie also recognises 
this as a request for certain symbols – agreeing to “put on a big white dress and dance 
down the aisle”. It is important to recognise here that this episode of Grey’s aired in 2009, 
years before marriage equality was legalised. Carlos’ wish is not for his daughter to receive 
all the same benefits as a heterosexual couple through legalised same sex marriage, rather 
it is for her to perform a wedding for himself and his wife, for her to perform 
homonormativity and therefore become less threatening to his family’s way of life.  
This exchange sets out conditions for Carlos’ relationship with his daughter. Callie must 
perform a wedding in order to convince her father that her relationship and her identity as 
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a bisexual woman are legitimate and can be successful. She must ally his fears of her queer 
life as an unhappy one by committing to the possibility of a wedding and children, which, as 
markers of heterosexual time (Goltz, 2010), symbolise happiness and success. Her queer 
happiness alone is not enough. 
If marriage is an indicator of happiness, and marriage is homonormative, then it follows 
that homonormativity is an indicator of happiness, and so, happiness itself is 
homonormative. In order to be happy, gay people must reject any notion of difference, any 
idea of changing societal norms, and instead embrace the concept of sameness in order to 
gain access to those norms. To refer back to Ahmed: 
Happiness seems to involve here a narrative of assimilation in the specific sense of 
becoming like. I considered earlier how if recognition for queers is made conditional 
on happiness, then they might have to minimize signs of queerness. One could also 
ask whether queer happiness involves an increasing proximity to social forms that 
are already attributed as happiness-causes (the family, marriage, class mobility, 
whiteness), which of course suggests that promoting queer happiness might involve 
promoting social forms in which other queers will not be able to participate. (2010, 
112) 
For Ahmed not only must gay people aspire to heterosexual happiness causes, they must 
also attain happiness – or at least give the impression of having attained happiness - in 
order to be recognised at all. In her chapter on The Unhappy Queer, Ahmed discusses “the 
psychic drama of the queer child”, positing that the parents of a queer child are less 
unhappy because the child is queer, but more “unhappy about the child being unhappy” 
(2010, 92). This positions queerness as a bringer of unhappiness, by its very construction as 
a life that rejects heteronormativity and therefore happiness. Ahmed describes happiness 
as almost communal, one’s unhappiness – or one’s life which is judged to be unhappy – 
causes unhappiness in others, and vice versa. In order to sustain happiness, everyone must 
be happy. Happiness is again tied to a certain idea of a heterosexual future: 
The parent makes an act of identification with an imagined future of necessary and 
inevitable unhappiness. Such an identification through grief about what the child will 
lose reminds us that the queer life is already constructed as an unhappy life, as a life 
without the “things” that make you happy, or as a life that is depressed as it lacks 
certain things: a husband, children. (2010, 93) 
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In order to redress their parents’ happiness, the queer child must prove that their life too 
can be happy, and can emulate the kind of happiness that is recognised by its adjacency to 
heterosexuality. The queer child must perform homonormativity in order to eliminate the 
parents’ unhappiness about their perceived unhappiness. As we have seen in Goltz’s work, 
no alternative happiness will be accepted in the “heteronormative court”, only a future 
which follows heterosexual time – a homonormative future - will do. This then reinforces 
shame in the queer child, as they come to see their queerness as a source of their parents’ 
unhappiness, if not also their own.  
Callie’s promised wedding materialises in the season seven episode White Wedding. Here 
Grey’s focuses on Callie’s relationship with her mother – Lucia – as Carlos’ issues with his 
daughter’s sexuality are considered resolved. Callie must again play the role of the queer 
child pleading to her parent’s heteronormative court when Lucia makes it clear that she is 
unsupportive of the wedding: 
Callie: I’ve been bending over backwards since you first got here just to make you   
            feel comfortable.  
Lucia: I didn’t ask you to do anything for me. 
Callie: I’m getting married in a church for you 
Lucia: Don’t you dare imply that there’s anything about a wedding to a woman or a  
            baby out of wedlock that’s for me.  
(Grey’s Anatomy: White Wedding 2011) 
Callie has planned certain aspects of her wedding to appease her mother’s Catholicism – 
she’s getting married in a church, with a minister, the couple say grace before their meals, 
she has a veil made to look like her mother’s – specifically to assuage her mother’s 
discomfort at her marrying another woman. Callie makes her wedding more traditional in 
order to please her mother, making the wedding – a symbol of her relationship - and her 
life, seem as close to a heterosexual one as possible so that her mother will not only 
recognise the wedding (and Callie and Arizona’s child) as happiness markers, but also 
accept her daughter’s relationship as non-threatening.  
Callie’s efforts to please her mother are, however, in vain. Lucia cannot reconcile her 
Catholic beliefs with her daughter’s sexuality and refuses to attend the wedding: 
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Lucia: Do you know how devastating it is to raise a child, to love a child, and know  
            you won’t see that child in heaven?  
Callie: Oh, Mom 
Lucia: You are not a bride. And I am not the mother of the bride. And this, this isn’t  
            your wedding. It isn’t right. I’m sorry. I can’t be here. I just can’t.  
(Grey’s Anatomy: White Wedding, 2011) 
Here Lucia becomes Ahmed’s parent who is “unhappy about the child being unhappy”. 
Here the perceived unhappiness is not so much about an unhappy life, but an unhappy 
afterlife. Callie is then positioned as the queer child, trying to reduce her parent’s 
unhappiness by performing homonormative happiness, through the traditional trappings of 
a white wedding.  
The episode concludes with the White Wedding of the episode’s title. Callie and Arizona are 
married by their friend and mentor Miranda Bailey after their minister is called away. 
Though this traditional element is changed, the rest of their wedding has all the tropes of a 
traditional heterosexual wedding – both brides wear white wedding gowns, are walked 
down the aisle by men (Arizona by her father, Callie by Mark – the father of their child), 
and exchange vows and rings (see fig.2). The traditional elements of their wedding are 
highlighted by their stark contrast with another wedding which takes place in the same 
episode – that of Meredith and Derek. The culmination of another storyline in the episode 
where the couple decides to adopt a baby, Meredith and Derek’s wedding is spontaneous 
and purely about their legal status as a couple. They are married at city hall, by a judge, in 
their work clothes (see fig.3). They have no rings, exchange rudimentary vows and have no 
family or friends in attendance. Their decision to formalise their relationship is solely to 
help their chances of adoption – they do not need marriage to legitimise their relationship. 
By splicing scenes of a non-traditional heterosexual wedding into the sequence of Callie 
and Arizona’s same sex white wedding, Grey’s is making a clear statement in support of 
Marriage Equality (which at the time of showing was still four years away). By showing 
Meredith and Derek’s wedding as a mere formalisation, performed perfunctorily by a judge 
in a courtroom, alongside Callie and Arizona’s carefully planned expression of love and 
commitment in front of friends and family, the programme provides a rebuttal of the 
conservative argument that same sex marriage would threaten the sanctity of marriage, 
showing a same sex couple as far more reverent of this and the traditions of a wedding 
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than a heterosexual couple, who are able to access the full legal protections of marriage on 
a whim.  
In the closing scene of White Wedding, Callie’s father returns to her wedding alone. He cuts 
into the father/daughter dance section of the reception and asks to dance with his 
daughter: 
Carlos: I was driving to the airport with your mother and it hit me. I’ve been looking 
             forward to dancing with you on your wedding day since I first held you in my  
             arms. So I turned the car around and I came back. So, here I am. To have this 
             dance. With my daughter.  
(Grey’s Anatomy: White Wedding, 2011) 
Though positioned as a display of her father’s acceptance and a symbol of him choosing his 
daughter’s happiness over that of his wife, Carlos never makes reference to Callie’s 
happiness at all in his speech, only his own. He returns because he wants to dance with his 
daughter at her wedding, because his daughter’s wedding is a symbol of success for him as 
a father. Callie’s wedding is yet again positioned as a source of her parent’s happiness, 
through fulfilling their wishes for her. For Carlos, the fact that Callie is getting married holds 
more significance than who she is marrying. The wedding ceremony serves as a symbol that 
his daughter is happy and leading a meaningful, successful life. She has reached a milestone 
that he had envisioned for her since she was born, and this makes him happy. Callie’s 
happiness is not her own, rather it is a way of making her parents happy, successfully or 
otherwise.  
If a queer life is already coded as unhappy, with the vision of a future outside of 
heterosexuality as lacking that which brings happiness, then queer lives can only achieve 
recognised happiness when they approximate heterosexuality – or when they include 
heterosexual happiness indicators such as marriage and children. Queerness is then 
defined as unhappy against straightness’ happiness, reinforcing a shameful narrative of 
homosexuality as not only a barrier to “the good life” but also as something to be actively 
worked against, in the pursuit of enough happiness objects to make a queer life look as 
heterosexual as possible. Grey’s Anatomy shows its audience that its gay characters can 
achieve happiness, but it does so through a homonormative lens, providing Callie and 
Arizona with a child and a traditional wedding to give them as many recognisable happiness 
markers as possible. For Grey’s, this approach to marriage and weddings is incongruous, as 
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the series often uses the paradigm of a wedding as a source of conflict or tragedy. The 
presentation of a big white wedding as a ubiquitously happy event is specific to Callie and 
Arizona’s storyline and is markedly different from how Grey’s has presented the concept of 
marriage and the trappings of a traditional wedding ceremony in previous storylines, 
specifically a major plotline featuring Christina Yang 
In season three episode Didn’t We Almost Have It All?, Christina’s engagement to her 
partner and boss Preston Burke falls apart at their elaborate wedding ceremony, where 
Burke leaves her at the altar. Throughout Christina’s arc as a character, her relationship 
with traditional femininity is explored through her negotiation with her unrelenting 
commitment to her job, and her relationships with men and the idea of family. Christina is 
presented as steadfastly ambitious and unwilling to compromise when it comes to her 
career. She does not want to have children and often chooses her job over her personal 
relationships. During the episode, Christina’s friend Meredith takes on the job of making 
sure Christina makes it down the aisle. Christina’s happiness – symbolised by her wedding – 
is evidence to Meredith that “people like them” can be “normal” and happy. Meredith 
wants her friend to get married to prove to her that marriage is a possibility for her as well, 
not necessarily because she thinks it will make Christina happy. Throughout the episode 
Christina rubs up against the traditional trappings of the big white wedding her fiancé 
insisted upon. She is disgruntled when her boss gives her the day off to prepare, preferring 
to be working than “doing wedding stuff”, she is sceptical when she’s gifted a family 
heirloom choker necklace which feels far too tight to wear, and she’s horrified when 
Burke’s mother plucks her eyebrows out in an attempt to beautify her ready for the 
ceremony. Christina has a panic attack in the church vestibule as she’s due to walk down 
the aisle. She asks Meredith to tell her what she would tell Meredith if their roles were 
reversed: 
Meredith: Stop whining. This is your wedding day. You will go down that aisle and 
                   you will get married. If I have to kick your ass every step of the way to get  
                   you there, you will walk down the aisle, you will get married. Do you hear 
                   me Christina? We need this. We need you to get your happy ending.  
                   (Grey’s Anatomy: Didn’t We Almost Have It All? 2007) 
Again, Meredith ties Christina’s perceived happiness to her own, it is “we” who need the 
wedding to go ahead, not “you”. Christina’s actual needs are not taken into account. Both 
Christina and Meredith push for the wedding to go ahead to prove that they are happy, 
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that they are capable of happiness, but it is clear that the wedding is not making Christina 
happy.  
Just as Christina prepares to walk down the aisle, Burke comes into the vestibule and tells 
her he’s leaving. He knows she doesn’t want to get married and he doesn’t want to force 
her to become someone she isn’t.  
Christina: I am wearing the dress. I am ready. And maybe I didn’t want to before but 
                  now I really do think I want this.  
 
Burke: I really wish that you didn’t think. I wish that you knew.  
(Grey’s Anatomy: Didn’t We Almost Have It All? 2007) 
Christina references her dress as evidence that she’s ready to get married. She has bent to 
the will of her fiancé and embraced the trappings of an extravagant wedding. Her white 
dress is a symbol of her willingness to become a wife. Christina “thinks she wants this”, she 
doesn’t know. She is getting married not because she knows this is what she wants, 
because she wants to commit to Burke and believes that married life will make her happy, 
but because marriage seems like something she should want to do, because she thinks she 
should want it, because marriage is a happiness marker.  
At the end of the episode Christina returns to Burke’s apartment and stands alone in her 
wedding dress (see fig. 4). Meredith walks through the door: 
Christina: He’s gone.  
Meredith: I don’t think he’s gone.  
Christina: No, his trumpet was here. His entire Eugene Foote collection, vinyls and  
                  CDs, his grandmother’s picture was by the bed, his lucky scrub cap was  
                  hanging by the door. 
  
                  He’s gone! I’m, I’m free!  
(Grey’s Anatomy: Didn’t We Almost Have It All? 2007) (See Fig. 5) 
Christina starts hyperventilating and Meredith helps her take off the choker necklace that 
represented her identity as a “Burke woman”. Meredith gets some scissors and cuts 
Christina’s white dress off her, holding her as she cries in sheer relief (See figs. 6,7,8).  
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Christina is freed by the cancellation of her wedding, she is so relieved that she cries. This 
scene shows her realisation that she in fact did not want what she was supposed to want. 
Christina realises that the marriage/happiness connection is a lie. This is not her happy 
ending. Meredith cuts away Christina’s wedding dress, destroying the symbol of traditional 
femininity that is literally suffocating her. Through this episode, Grey’s Anatomy echoes the 
soap opera trope of the wedding gone wrong, as discussed in Chapter One. Christina and 
Burke’s elaborate wedding ceremony is a source of conflict, not happiness, and ultimately 
marks the exit of a series regular as Burke leaves the programme soon after5. Whereas such 
episodes in soap operas are often used to emphasise the sadness of a tragedy as it takes 
place on an occasion which is expected to be happy – “the happiest day of one’s life” even 
– Didn’t We Almost Have It All? Instead uses the failed wedding as an example of a wedding 
as an unhappy occasion in itself, rather than a happy day marred by an outside tragedy. 
Christina does not want to get married. For her, the traditional big wedding is a deeply 
uncomfortable experience and the idea of a married future is suffocating. Here Grey’s 
Anatomy presents a wedding which audiences hope will go wrong, so that Christina is freed 
from the constraints of what she is expected to want, what she know should make her 
happy, but what is clearly the wrong decision.  
Christina and Burke’s impending marriage is allowed to be presented as something other 
than happy. Marriage for Christina is a bad choice, something she feels pressured into but 
doesn’t actually want. Christina is allowed to reject marriage, to find it stifling and be 
overwhelmingly relieved when it doesn’t happen. This narrative is not permitted in Callie 
and Arizona’s wedding. For a same sex couple, marriage must be universally happy, 
scepticism or doubt is not allowed. Heterosexual Christina can refer to marriage as 
“becoming chattel”, but lesbian Arizona must put her previously established doubts of 
marriage and motherhood aside and embrace homonormativity. Christina’s wedding is a 
source of conflict and drama, further establishing her character as rejecting of traditional 
ideals of femininity and family, in favour of her career. Callie and Arizona’s wedding has no 
room for non-traditional elements and no space for anything other than happiness. A 
smaller subplot in White Wedding features Arizona struggling with there not being a 
scheduled moment of silence in the ceremony to remember her dead brother. Even though 
this lack of recognition of unhappiness makes Arizona unhappy, nothing is changed, there is 
                                                          
5 It is perhaps interesting to note here that Burke was written out of Grey’s Anatomy after actor 
Isaiah Washington used gay slurs against fellow cast member TR Knight. The wedding episode may 
have ended differently if his character had remained on the programme.  
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no moment of remembrance, Arizona must contain her sadness in a moment of emotion 
before the ceremony (See Fig.9), and then maintain a happy façade, in order to keep the 
wedding a happy event.  
This presentation of Callie and Arizona’s wedding as unfalteringly happy continues after 
White Wedding as the programme treats the episode as the happy ending to Callie’s 
struggles with her family’s homophobia. Though Callie ultimately has her father attend her 
wedding, her mother never reappears during the episode. The audience is given no 
information as to her whereabouts, left to assume that she is still sitting outside in the car 
after Carlos changed his mind en route to the airport. This conflict is never resolved, she is 
still against Callie’s wedding and still dismisses her family as immoral. Callie does not ask 
Carlos about her mother, her father’s attendance is seemingly enough for her. Though this 
lack of a neat and tidy ending reflects real life situations where queer people’s parents may 
disagree on their approaches towards their child’s sexuality, and acknowledges the real 
difficulties that queer people with religious families often face, the decision to paper over 
the pain that this causes by making no further mention of Lucia’s disapproval seems to 
suggest that it is inconsequential. Callie’s mother isn’t featured, or even mentioned, at all in 
the rest of her time on the series – a further five seasons. There is no reconciliation as 
there is with her father, and there is no mention of any prolonged strife caused by her 
rejection. The issue simply disappears. Callie’s family’s difficulty in accepting her sexuality 
including both her parents’ aggressive rejections of her, her relationship and her baby 
daughter, their insistence that she was going to hell, a long lasting separation from her 
entire family – orchestrated by her father, her father’s attempt to “pray away the gay”, and 
her mother’s refusal to witness her wedding, are all solved by a dance with her dad at her 
wedding reception.  
Through their foregrounding of the issue of Marriage Equality, neoliberal approaches to 
LGBTQ rights strategies positioned homonormativity as the ultimate path to happiness for 
gay and lesbian individuals. This connection between homonormativity and happiness 
promoted assimilation and largely ignored intersectionalities within the LGBTQ community, 
allowing for the privileging of white, cisgender, affluent gay and lesbian individuals over 
those who could not, or would not, conform to homonormative paradigms. The idealisation 
of marriage as a technique of “pleading to the heteronormative court”, presented marriage 
as the only way for gay and lesbian people to attain happiness, therefore implying that a 
queer life without marriage is an unhappy life. As network television exists in a neoliberal 
space, ideations of homonormativity can be seen within the content of its programming as 
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it attempts to please both sides of the political spectrum. Grey’s Anatomy provides its same 
sex couple with a traditional white wedding during the run up to the Supreme Court’s 
decision on Marriage Equality, presenting them as Goltz’s “good gays” who respect the 
institution of marriage and want to be allowed to participate in it. Callie and Arizona’s 
wedding is presented as a happy ending to Callie’s issues with her homophobic parents, 
despite her mother’s continuing rejection of her and her family. Unhappiness is not 
permitted in Callie and Arizona’s wedding, positioning it in contrast to previous 
representations of marriage in the Grey’s universe which allowed its heterosexual 
characters to critique marriage and reject it altogether. Though White Wedding presents a 
happy ending for Callie’s relationship with her father, it is important to mention that it does 
not act as a happy ending for Callie and Arizona’s relationship. The characters experience 
unhappiness and conflict throughout the rest of their tenure on the programme, including 
the breakdown of their relationship. However, these unhappinesses are notably detached 
from the characters’ queerness, existing as dramatic plot points which could reasonably 
happen to any of the Grey’s characters regardless of their sexuality. Callie and Arizona’s 
wedding may not have protected them from general future unhappiness, but it does 
provide a happy ending for their past queer unhappiness, allowing them to experience 















Chapter Three: Gay Unhappiness, Queer Unhappiness 
For gay characters on network television, happiness and homonormativity are linked 
through the institution of marriage. In this chapter I discuss portrayals of gay unhappiness 
and discuss whether as homonormativity is tied to happiness, queerness is then defaulted 
to a position of unhappiness. I offer a working definition of gayness and queerness and 
examine what gay unhappiness looks like on network television in a post Marriage Equality 
America – focusing specifically on the ABC programme How to Get Away with Murder. I 
question whether, in contemporary representations of gayness on network television, 
queerness has taken the place of gayness as a tragic consequence of failing to uphold 
hetero/homonormativity. I continue to draw from Duggan’s concept of homonormativity, 
and look to Stephen Tropiano’s history of gay characters on television for context on the 
relationship between gay representations on television and shifts in public opinion. I 
further refer to Goltz’s work on gay futurity and Edelman’s writings on the spectre of AIDS 
discourse in the writing of gay stories.  
Whilst historical representations of gay and lesbian characters relied on stories of tragedy 
and isolation, modern gay characters are less defined by their sexuality and given the 
opportunity to achieve happiness in the same way as their heterosexual counterparts – 
through marriage. This link between marriage as a homonormative concept and happiness, 
ties happiness and homonormativity together and implies that happiness can only be 
achieved by gay characters if they reinforce heterosexual norms and follow a heterosexual 
timeline. The question then becomes, if happiness is tied to homonormativity, is gayness 
still tied to unhappiness, to tragedy? Does this binary still relegate gayness to a position of 
lacking, of yearning for a happiness embodied by the heterosexual ideal? Do happy gay 
characters who reach a point of happiness through a homonormative lens, reinforce the 
idea that gayness and happiness are incompatible?  
Clearly happy gay characters exist on network television. Callie and Arizona are shown as 
experiencing happiness for a time on Grey’s Anatomy. As shown in Chapter Two, their 
wedding is an unwaveringly happy occasion, their relationship is shown as stable and loving 
for a season after their wedding episode and they are both ultimately given an off camera 
happy ending, implying the reunion of their family unit, after Arizona’s departure in season 
fourteen. The characters however, do exist in a network drama, and therefore experience 
unhappiness throughout their tenure on the programme. After their wedding, Callie and 
Arizona’s unhappiness is caused by external circumstances that affect other, straight 
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characters on the programme as well – a plane crash that causes Arizona to lose a leg, the 
depression and PTSD that she suffers as a result of this, infidelity, divorce, and a custody 
battle – none of which explicitly intersect with the characters’ bisexuality or lesbianism. 
Even the custody battle, where Callie – who is the biological mother of their child Sofia – 
wants to take Sofia to live in New York with her new partner, doesn’t touch on the 
specificities of a same sex custody trial, instead playing out with very little mention of any 
issues which could have arisen from their situation as a same sex couple. Contrast this with 
a similar storyline in ER (a spiritual predecessor to Grey’s) during the early 2000s, where 
Doctor Kerry Weaver (one of NBC’s – and primetime network television’s – first recurring 
gay characters) fights her late partner Sandy’s parents for custody of their child. Here, 
Kerry’s homosexuality proves to be a stumbling block in her case, as Sandy’s parents 
disapprove of their daughter’s homosexuality and judge Kerry to be unfit to take care of 
their grandson. Kerry’s lack of a biological connection to her son is also used against her in 
the case, and provides the basis of the grandparents’ claim for custody. The legal issues 
which Kerry Weaver faces in ER are not mentioned in Callie and Arizona’s storyline in Grey’s 
Anatomy, over fifteen years later, implying that those issues are no longer present for gay 
couples post- Marriage Equality. Callie and Arizona experience the same amount of sadness 
that any heterosexual couple would during a legal battle for custody of their child – their 
gayness plays no part. Institutional homophobia does not come into play and, ultimately, 
the issue of a biological connection to the child – which proved difficult to overcome for 
Kerry Weaver – proves inconsequential, as Arizona is granted full custody by the court.  
This lack of institutional homophobia presented in Callie and Arizona’s storylines across 
their seasons of Grey’s echoes early criticism showrunner Shonda Rimes drew for her 
treatment of race and her practice of “colour-blind casting”. Critics claimed that by 
disregarding race in the casting process, and making little mention of race within the 
shows’ narratives, Rimes created a “post-racial” utopia in her programming which failed to 
engage with the reality of institutional racism in the US. Jade Petermon connects this trend 
in the early seasons of Rimes’ programmes with neoliberalism, focusing on the characters 
of Richard Webber and Miranda Bailey in Grey’s whose career successes and positions of 
power within the hospital are seen as unremarkable and untouched by the institutional 
racism which they would likely have experienced in reality. Petermon writes: 
The bootstraps narrative, on which neoliberalism’s cult of individual responsibility 
hinges, requires that tokens exist as examples of what is possible if only an individual 
works hard enough. (2018, 103) 
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By choosing to leave Webber and Bailey’s race un-remarked upon, their success can be 
read as an endorsement of neoliberal ideals and of the idea that the US is living in a post-
racial era. Petermon contextualises this as neoliberalism “appopriat[ing] the look and 
language of progress to renew oppressive mechanisms and stifle bona fide societal 
transformation.” (2018, 104). Superficially, Rimes’ programming presents racially diverse 
casts which all prominently feature women of colour in positions of power who are 
successful in their white collar, intellectual careers. However, by failing to include specific 
commentary on race or present racism as a barrier which these women have had to 
overcome, these representations of black success serve to erase racism entirely, feeding 
into a neoliberal narrative that racism no longer has an impact on the lives of black 
Americans.  
This criticism of the way race is presented in early seasons of Shonda Rimes’ programming6 
echoes the treatment of gayness in Grey’s. Callie and Arizona are both successful LGBTQ 
women for whom homophobia has had little to no impact on their careers. Callie’s family’s 
refusal to accept her bisexuality is the only instance of homophobia experienced by either 
character, and this is presented as an anomaly. It is also important to note the racial 
context here as Callie is Latina and her family’s disapproval of her relationship is shown to 
be rooted in their Catholicism and Latinx culture. Petermon’s analysis of how race 
intersects with neoliberal ideals in Shondaland7 can also be applied in a wider context to 
identity politics as a whole, including representations of sexuality and gender.  
Callie and Arizona’s gayness is never portrayed as a source of unhappiness after their 
wedding – where Callie’s struggle to be accepted by her father is resolved. They experience 
the same level of drama as their heterosexual counterparts, their gayness having little to no 
impact on their happinesses or unhappinesses. They experience no direct homophobia 
after their wedding, encounter no institutional barriers or professional bias, and rarely, if 
ever, come into contact with gay issues outside of their middle class experiences. Similarly, 
their moments of joy or positive experiences are also rarely directly related to their 
gayness. Neither Callie nor Arizona are shown to have gay friends or a queer community 
with whom they spend time, there are no on-screen celebrations of LGBTQ political 
                                                          
6 Petermon focuses specifically on early seasons of Grey’s and Scandal, noting that Rimes’ approach 
to race later shifted, perhaps as a result of her success and the power she gained as a result. Rimes’ 
later show, How to Get Away with Murder is not discussed specifically in this context.  
7 Shondaland refers to Shonda Rimes’ production company which created and ran Grey’s Anatomy 




achievements.  Callie and Arizona are portrayed as gay and happy – the two states 
coexisting, but rarely intersecting. As gay characters such as Callie and Arizona are so 
infrequently required to engage with the political aspects of their sexuality, this raises the 
question of whether it is not gayness that is incompatible with happiness, but instead 
queerness. Gay characters can live happy lives – or at least lives that match up with widely 
accepted happiness indicators – but this happiness is often gained by sacrificing their 
queerness. The happy gay characters we see on network television often live lives that 
follow a homonormative timeline. So, when happiness is tied to straightness – or 
approximations of straightness – it is then queerness which is positioned as the binary 
opposite, with gayness permitted access to straight happiness as long as it renounces 
queerness and embraces heterosexual norms.  
To investigate this, first one must examine the difference between gayness and queerness. 
In her introduction to New Queer Cinema: A Critical Reader, Michele Aaron defines queer 
as: 
represent[ing] the resistance to, primarily, the normative codes of gender and sexual 
expression – that masculine men sleep with feminine women  - but also to the 
restrictive potential of gay and lesbian sexuality – that only men sleep with men, and 
women sleep with women. In this way, queer, as a critical concept, encompasses the 
non-fixity of gender expression and non-fixity of both straight and gay sexuality 
(2004, 5) 
She goes on to say: 
To be queer now… means to be untethered from “conventional” codes of behaviour. 
At its most expansive and utopian, queer contests (hetero- and homo- ) normality 
(2004, 5) 
Queerness then focuses on fluidity, rejecting the idea that identities are fixed and that 
binaries can be easily constructed and maintained, both between the constructs of “gay” 
and “straight” but also within its own community, allowing for concepts such as “gay” and 
“lesbian” to be questioned. Queer contests. Queer is active, and reactive – denying 
restriction and questioning norms. Gayness was constructed in opposition to straightness, 
providing a binary opposite to reinforce the concept of heterosexuality. Without gayness, 
straightness would not need to define itself, as Becker explains: 
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As socially constricted concepts, homosexuality and heterosexuality are mutually 
dependent terms. One doesn’t mean anything without the other. These two 
paradigmatic options also comprise a status hierarchy in which the dominance of 
heterosexuality is established at homosexuality’s expense. Being straight has been 
moral, legal, and normal, because being gay has been constructed as immoral, illegal, 
and abnormal (2006, 7) 
Gayness was constructed by straightness, in order to form a negative to its positive. 
Queerness however constructed itself as an attempt to break out of that binary, to blur the 
lines between this or that, and to question the idea of categories altogether. Queerness 
creates a collective identification, including not only gay and lesbian identities but also 
bisexuality, transsexuality and gender non-conformity. One doesn’t have be gay to be 
queer, and one can easily be gay and reject queerness altogether. (Dyer, 2002) If gayness 
speaks to sexual identity, queerness speaks to a sexual politics, to an activism grounded in 
sexual identity but not fixed within it.  
Queerness requires political engagement, insofar as it requires an awareness of the part 
that binary designations play in the distribution of power and a commitment to challenging 
that system, whether that be purely through one’s own existence, or through active 
participation in protest and political process. Queerness can also be defined as anti-
assimilation: 
In opposition to such reformist “we’re just like you” goals, queer theorists have 
focused their attention on identity’s contingency, fluidity and constructedness and 
suggested that it is in the destabilisation of identity categories that effective political 
practice is to be found. (Currah, 2001, 180) 
Assimilationist tactics prioritise access to heterosexual paradigms, convincing those in 
power that gay people are “just like you”, erasing difference and promoting the idea that 
gay people want the same things as straight people – they aren’t a threat, they want access 
to straight institutions, not to break them down. Queerness instead focuses on difference – 
forms a communal identity from being “not”, and rejects the hegemony of patriarchal 
institutions. Queerness opposes institutions and aims to disrupt the binaries that maintain 
them. Queerness cannot assimilate as assimilation requires a tacit support of the structures 
it desires access to. Queerness aims to break down those structures and sees disassembling 
as more effective than falling into line. In these ways queerness can be seen as an 
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alternative to Duggan’s homonormativity, refusing to “go home and cook dinner forever” 
(2002, 189).  
If one can distinguish between gayness and queerness, then it is clear to see that whereas 
gayness was previously tied to unhappiness in historical representations of gay characters 
on television, it is now queerness that takes its place as the tragic counterpart – not to 
straightness, but to homonormativity. Callie and Arizona can be read as gay but not queer8 
and perhaps this is why they are permitted happiness on screen. Another ABC programme, 
created by the same production company as Grey’s (Shonda Rimes’ Shondaland), soapy 
legal thriller How to Get Away with Murder (hereinafter referred to as Murder) features 
same sex characters whose identities fall closer to the concept of queerness than those in 
Grey’s, however the programme consistently constructs their queerness as tied to their 
unhappiness.  
Murder focuses on a group of law students who repeatedly find themselves involved in 
murders and their subsequent cover ups. The programme follows the personal 
relationships of the group and their professor, as they struggle to keep their secrets and 
deal with their guilty consciences. One central character is Connor Walsh, a gay man who 
enjoys a life of casual sex and no strings attached hook-ups, and often employs his sexuality 
to get ahead in his career. During the first season of Murder Connor finds himself 
developing feelings for Oliver Hampton, an IT specialist – and tries to give up his lifestyle of 
casual sex in order to settle into a monogamous relationship. Connor and Oliver’s on/off 
relationship becomes one of the more prominent personal storylines in the programme 
and spans all of the shows’ five seasons to date.  
Murder is a programme about suffering – each of the six central protagonists deals with 
extreme trauma, guilt, and the fear of being found out and sent to prison – but pain and 
unhappiness seem to be more integral to Connor and Oliver’s storyline than to the other 
relationships on the programme. Throughout the series unhappiness breaks Connor and 
Oliver apart, and brings them back together. During the first season, Connor sees Oliver as 
a chance at happiness, at first considering himself to be unable to form a lasting 
relationship, but later realising he wants stable monogamy more than his former life of 
sexual freedom. Connor’s participation in casual sex and hook-up culture is tied to sadness, 
                                                          
8 Neither Callie – who is newly bisexual – nor Arizona - who is established as a long time lesbian- 
interact with any other gay or lesbian characters that they are not in relationships with. They have 
no community of LGBTQ friends, they rarely encounter homophobia, personal or institutional, and 
do not engage with politics in any way.  
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with Oliver representing monogamous domesticity and providing a happy escape from 
Connor’s self-loathing and guilt. As the two men develop their relationship, Oliver becomes 
more involved with Connor and his friend’s wrongdoings and begins to suffer as well.  
Murder uses blocking and framing to delineate between Oliver as happy, domestic, 
monogamy and Connor as unhappy, lonely, promiscuity. Thresholds become a consistent 
theme in their scenes together, whether this is Connor pushing his way through Oliver’s 
door after they reconcile (See fig. 10), being thrown out of Oliver’s doorway after an 
argument, or standing on the brink of their bedroom as Oliver reveals his HIV diagnosis 
(See fig. 11), Connor is regularly standing on the outside of domesticity, asking permission 
to be let in, or being rejected from Oliver’s domestic space. We never see Connor’s own 
apartment, scenes with Connor and Oliver always take place at Oliver’s home. Connor 
always shows up at Oliver’s door, never the other way around, which positions Oliver as a 
gatekeeper of sorts, with the power to decide whether Connor is allowed to access his 
domestic space, and the homonormativity that comes along with it. When Oliver breaks up 
with Connor after Connor sleeps with someone else, Oliver physically pushes Connor out of 
his apartment, through his front door and out into the hallway (See fig. 12). Connor has 
broken the rules of monogamy (and homonormativity) and is therefore ejected from 
domesticity. He later attempts a reconciliation by bringing flowers to Oliver’s door, but is 
turned away by a man Oliver is likely sleeping with who has temporarily taken his place in 
domestic bliss (See fig.13). Connor and Oliver get back together after Connor again shows 
up at Oliver’s door, this time reeling from the trauma of the group’s first murder, and in the 
middle of a hyperventilating panic attack (See fig 14.). It is only when Connor is truly 
suffering, both physically and mentally, that he is allowed back through Oliver’s door, and 
back into homonormativity.  
Here, Oliver takes the position of Goltz’s “good gay”, with Connor often finding himself on 
trial in his “heteronormative court”. When Connor is unable to meet homonormative 
standards, to comply with Goltz’s heteronormative time (commitment, monogamy etc.) he 
is punished, cast out, ejected from his haven of domestic bliss and thrown back into 
queerness, casual sex and self-loathing. He has sinned and must be banished from his 
“normal” domestic paradise. Oliver on the other hand exemplifies the “good gay” construct 
– he lacks narcissism, is dismissive of gay hook-up culture and wants to settle down and 
have children, and therefore represents happiness in contrast to Connor’s “bad queer” 
misery. Goltz suggests that the concept of the “good” or “normal” gay is used to further the 
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gay rights cause, by dismissing those aspects of gay culture which challenge 
heteronormative ideals as the follies of a minority of bad actors:  
The rhetorical strategy works to challenge the narratives that demonize gay men as 
sexually undisciplined, incapable of commitment, and anti-family, by constructing a 
“normal gay” who wants the same thing as “everyone else”. (2010, 87)  
Oliver falls definitively into the “normal gay” category, and his normalcy is used time and 
again throughout Murder to provide contrast to Connor’s queerness, create tensions in 
their relationship, and ultimately provide Connor with a path to homonormative happiness. 
Strangely, Connor is not at first presented as unhappy with his lifestyle of casual sex. He is 
confident, and revels in his ability to sleep with whichever man he chooses. It is only when 
he meets Oliver that he starts to think of his former life as unhappy and starts to feel 
ashamed of his sexual history. In this sense, Oliver not only provides Connor with a path to 
happiness, but also shows him that happiness is possible at all. By constructing Oliver’s life 
as a “normal gay” as a happy one, Murder positions Connor’s life as the binary opposite, as 
unhappy despite the lack of evidence to support this. Through Oliver, Connor sees his 
former life as merely shadows on his cave wall. Once Oliver brings him out into the light, he 
can no longer go back to enjoying the show.  
At the end of season one, Oliver is diagnosed as HIV positive after he and Connor break up 
and Oliver tries out casual sex. Oliver’s diagnosis is set up as a twist for the audience, who 
are primed to think that Connor would be the one more likely to have contracted an STI 
from his former involvement in hook-up culture. Oliver is portrayed as nervous, nerdy, and 
sexually unconfident. He is interested in long term relationships rather than one night 
stands and often seems intimidated by the idea of casual sex. The revelation that Oliver is 
positive, is therefore intended to be a shock to the audience and can easily be read as a 
punishment for Oliver having strayed into queer hook-up culture, and away from 
homonormativity. Oliver betrays his position as the “good gay” and is punished. Despite 
modern understandings of the disease and work to dispel the myths surrounding the AIDS 
epidemic, culturally, the mention of HIV still brings forth echoes of the anti-gay rhetoric 
used by conservative governments during the 80s. When seen in the context of a gay man 
contracting HIV through casual sex, it is difficult to separate the spurious cultural 
associations of HIV as a “gay plague” caused by sexual liberation and cast as some kind of 
karmic punishment for daring to break with heterosexual norms, from what we now know 
about the condition. This association between HIV and gayness was reinforced by the use 
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of HIV as a storyline on network medical dramas during the 80s, where the condition was 
often used as a teachable moment to educate viewers about homosexuality and 
homophobia by featuring patients diagnosed with the disease (Tropiano, 2002, 33).  
Edelman discusses the construction of AIDS narratives in his work Homographesis:  
In the mirror of “AIDS” the erotic abandon, the luxurious collapse into the “black 
hole” of desire, must give way, depending on the stripe of the narrative, to death, as 
a recognition of the wages of sin; to monogamy, as a recognition of the immaturity 
of “promiscuity”; or to activism, as a recognition of the political folly of defining gay 
identity through sexuality alone. (1994, 115) 
For Edelman, narratives surrounding AIDS construct the disease as a punishment for the 
perceived excesses of homosexuality – and specifically, anal sex. AIDS becomes an impetus, 
causing either death or the renouncing of queer excess. Because of its connection to the 
gay community, AIDS is mythologised into a consequence of living outside of 
heterosexuality and the traditional family unit. In Murder, Oliver is made to suffer because 
he is tempted into queer promiscuity and non-monogamy. He gives into his desire, and 
embraces what is expected of him as a gay man who has recently been spurned - he later 
explains that his friends convinced him to “get laid, rebound the pain away” (How to Get 
Away with Murder: She’s Dying, 2015). His HIV status later confines him to monogamy, as 
he struggles to find men other than Connor who will sleep with him. Oliver’s connection 
with Connor allows Connor to see a path to happiness but provides Oliver with a path to 
suffering. Where Connor is permitted a chance at salvation through Oliver’s “good gay” 
persona, Oliver is tainted by Connor’s “bad gay” designation, by his queerness.  
It is important to note that Oliver’s HIV status is not presented as a death sentence. In fact, 
Murder goes out of its way to show its audiences the strides that have been made in HIV 
research and treatments. Oliver is –at time of writing – still alive in the series. He 
occasionally makes mention of his low “viral load” and at one point explains to a potential 
sexual partner that it would be safer to sleep with him than with a person who hasn’t been 
tested. Connor and Oliver both take PrEP when their relationship resumes, and there is 
frank and open discussion about what this means for their sexual relationship. In many 
ways Murder portrays a modern take on HIV, taking care to destigmatise the disease and 
present a realistic, up to date characterisation of living with the disease, rather than dying 
from it. However, for all its ground-breaking frank discussions of gay HIV + life, Murder still 
frames Oliver’s HIV as a consequence of his breaching of homonormativity and straying 
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into queerness. Murder may not show HIV as capital punishment, but it is punishment 
nonetheless. Through this, not only is casual sex contextualised as queer, but so is its 
consequence – HIV. Oliver’s construction as a “good gay” allows for a queer storyline to be 
told through a homonormative character, allowing the network to tell a queer story in a 
way that fits its neoliberal sensibilities. Murder recognises HIV as an enduring part of many 
gay men’s lives, gesturing to gay unhappiness in a context which allows for a distancing 
between the real life problems facing many positive gay men and the fictional reality of 
Oliver’s life living with the disease. For example, Oliver has a well-paid job, good healthcare 
coverage and a supportive group of friends and family. Oliver can afford the medication he 
needs to live with HIV, and have it make little impact on his day to day life. This is not the 
case for many gay men in reality who are lower class, underpaid or unemployed, homeless, 
or whose work doesn’t provide healthcare benefits. By telling a modern HIV storyline 
through Oliver, and not Connor, Murder is able to “normalise” HIV, to make it trivial, in 
much the same way that homonormative representations of gayness normalise queer 
identities.  
Throughout the next three seasons of Murder, Connor and Oliver’s relationship develops 
and the couple talk frequently about marriage. After rejecting a proposal from Oliver in 
season three, Connor proposes marriage again in season four: 
Connor: I owe you an apology. When my dad was in town he told me that he didn’t 
               think you were the right guy for me.  
Oliver: What? I was so nice! 
Connor: He’s a moron Oli, and wrong. Because I am so happy right now. To the point 
               that I’m calling my sister just to tell her how happy I am. And that’s never 
               happened before. And that’s because of you. So uh, this is a twisty tie, that I 
               took off our loaf of bread, which speaks to one of the reasons I love you,  
               because you’re a gay man who eats bread and encourages me to eat bread  
               too. You let me be me but you make me a better version of me and I never  
               thought that I could be this guy and I don’t want to wait anymore. I want  
               you. Marry me Oliver Hampton. Marry me so I can spend the rest of my life  
               trying to make you as happy as you make me.  
(How to Get Away with Murder: Nobody Roots for Goliath, 2018) 
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Connor proposes because he is happy. He knows he is happy because he performs 
happiness for his family members. He uses a “twisty tie” from a loaf of bread as an 
engagement ring, using a symbol of their “normal” and “boring” domesticity as a symbol of 
their commitment. The bread is also cited as a reason for Connor’s love of Oliver – that he 
eats bread, or that he is “not like other gays”. Diet culture and obsessions over body image 
have become tied to gay male culture, especially in the age of social media and the Insta-
gay. This connection between gay culture and narcissism is discussed by Edelman in 
Homographesis, where he suggests that discourses surrounding AIDS activism focused on 
demonising gay narcissism as gay passivity, and as counter-productive to activism. 
Narcissism was seen as a negative characteristic of gay culture, and one which prevented 
the community from taking decisive action to stop the spread of AIDS and demand political 
action on the issue. This criticism often came from within the gay community itself, with 
some politically active groups condemning those who continued to engage with club 
culture and casual sex.  (1994, 110) 
By holding Oliver up as an example of a man who refuses to engage with gay culture, and 
positioning him as a source of happiness because of his disavowal of such culture, Connor 
“emulates heterosexual contempt” (Edelman, 1994, 110) for the gay culture he sees as 
narcissistic. Connor wants to marry Oliver because Oliver is a “good gay”, because he 
doesn’t indulge in narcissism (or hook up culture), because he represents “normality”. By 
specifying that he loves Oliver for not buying into that culture, and for encouraging him to 
eschew it as well, Connor is in effect praising Oliver for rejecting queer culture (which we 
already know he rarely partakes in) and therefore recognising his own source of happiness 
as not only set apart from queerness, but that which pulls him away from his own 
queerness, into a more homonormative lifestyle.  
By constructing homonormativity as a path towards the happiness that marriage brings, 
network television such as Murder designates queerness as unhappy by default. If we 
assume that certain objects or states are happiness causes, then those who don’t possess 
those objects or reject those states are seen as lacking. Goltz describes this binary in terms 
of identification with a future: 
Heteronormative temporal perfection tells a story of happily ever after: love 
conquering all, the blessed gift of children, and a guaranteed slice of the American 
dream. Monogamous love, marriage, and procreation provide the keys to the 
kingdom, the honour of respectful sexual citizenship, and identification with a future 
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worth embracing. On the other side, there is punishment and misery for those who 
fail to embrace and perform the assumed rightness of heterosexuality or fail to 
identify with heteronormative structures for future building. (2010, 84) 
By reinforcing the concept of heteronormative time as the ideal, the bringer of happiness, 
Murder again presents marriage, happiness, and homonormativity as connected. Connor 
starts his storyline in queer unhappiness and works towards marriage as his happy ending. 
Queerness is positioned as before, homonormativity through marriage as the happily ever 
after. Weddings are also again connected with happiness here, with Connor and Oliver’s 
initial decision to get married without a wedding ceremony causing uproar from their 
friends who want a wedding to bring them joy. Eventually the couple change their minds 
after a visit to the Supreme Court reminds them of the gravity of the “people who fought 
tooth and nail for [them] to be gay and equal” (How to Get Away with Murder: The Day 
Before He Died, 2018), cementing Marriage Equality as a bringer of happiness, and a 
wedding as a symbol of that happiness.  
Through these connections between marriage, domesticity, homonormativity and 
happiness Murder suggests that choosing a life outside of this condemns one to a life of 
unhappiness and suffering. The suffering Connor and Oliver experience is caused by their 
rejections of homonormative happiness. Connor’s unhappiness outside of their relationship 
is soothed by his connection with Oliver and the concept of safe domesticity he provides. 
When the couple are separated, it is unhappiness which brings them back together, 
whether that be Connor’s attempts to escape his shame and self-loathing through 
identification with Oliver’s “good” gay persona, or the couple’s mutual unhappiness which 
marriage promises to resolve. A clear line is drawn, and exemplified by the thresholds 
Connor must navigate to gain access to domestic bliss – one is either a “good gay” living a 
monogamous, sexually conservative lifestyle, or one must suffer in one’s rejection of that 
normality, in one’s queerness.   
Through connecting same sex marriage, homonormativity and happiness, network 
television has moved on from representing gay lives as unhappy in contrast to straight 
lives, instead presenting queerness as unhappy in relation to homonormativity. Gay 
characters are either presented as non-queer and happy – as in Grey’s Anatomy, or queer 
and unhappy, striving to be given access to happy homonormativity as in Murder. This 
construction presents an idea of gayness which shuns queer identification and embraces 
homonormative institutions as the ideal, and the only way for gay people to achieve 
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happiness. Queer unhappiness is shown as the before, to happy homonormativity’s after, 
yet again using marriage as a straightening device, luring queers away from their unhappy 
lives of non-monogamy and blurred sexual lines, into monogamous, domestic, gay bliss. 
Queerness, and therefore anti-assimilation sexual politics, is shown as something from 
which to escape, rather than something to embrace and use for further gay liberation, 
again prizing a neoliberal stance on cultural and sexual politics which aims to silence the 
LGBTQ community by convincing them that they already have their happy ending, as long 






















Chapter Four: The Politics of Queer Unhappiness in the Trump Era 
In Chapter Three I discussed how the link between homonormativity, same-sex marriage 
and happiness, and the ways in which this link is reinforced by network television 
portrayals of gay and lesbian characters, positions queerness by default as a source of 
unhappiness. In this chapter I further examine the concept of queer unhappiness from a 
political perspective, questioning how unhappiness relates to political action and how 
queer unhappiness fits into the LGBTQ rights movement. I review the changing political 
climate in regards to LGBTQ issues as the US is nearing the end of the Trump 
administration’s first term, and question whether parallels can be drawn from this new 
level of political uncertainty to the prevalence of political commentary in network 
television. Drawing from Ahmed’s work on The Unhappy Queer, I focus specifically on the 
revival of Will & Grace and how its engagement with queer political issues allows for queer 
unhappiness to be seen on screen in a way that creates tension with its more conservative 
sitcom form. I focus on the political beginnings of the programme’s revival, and the 
contrast that this more politically vocal season has with the infamously apolitical original 
series run. I engage with three episodes in particular; 11 Years Later – where Grace is 
offered a job decorating Trump’s Oval Office, Grandpa Jack –  where Jack’s newly 
discovered grandson is sent to conversion therapy, and The Beefcake and the Cake Beef - 
where Grace fights for Karen’s right to have a bakery bake a cake for Trump’s birthday. 
Finally, I discuss whether the current political climate has put an end to the narrative of 
marriage equality as a happy ending for the LGBTQ rights movement, and whether network 
television’s neoliberal values will prevent mass market television from ever embracing 
queer perspectives and making decisive political statements.  
Just over a year after the Supreme Court voted to legalise same sex marriage across all fifty 
states, the US elected Donald Trump as their next president, ushering in a new wave of far 
right conservativism. After the 2016 election, LGBTQ rights organisation GLAAD started a 
running count of attacks on LGBTQ rights made by Trump and his administration. As of June 
2019, the count numbered 114 attacks, including verbal comments, tweets, memos, 
funding cuts and policy changes which directly or indirectly threaten the rights or freedoms 
of LGBTQ identified Americans. Though the full list is too numerous to include in its totality, 
here is a summary of said “attacks”, carried out from Trump’s swearing in as President in 
January 2017, to the time of writing in June 2019: 
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 Minutes after Trump is sworn in, any mention of the LGBTQ community is erased 
from government websites. 
 During a World AIDS Day proclamation, Trump fails to mention people of colour or 
the LGBTQ community. Soon after, he fires the entire staff of the White House 
Presidential Advisory Council on HIV/AIDS. A later review of government funding 
reveals that the Trump administration used AIDS relief funding to donate a grant to 
an anti LBGTQ group working in Africa. In March 2019, Trump’s 2020 Fiscal Year 
Budget cuts over $1.7 billion in spending from three key components in the global 
fight against HIV and AIDS.  
 Protections for trans people who are incarcerated were rolled back, allowing 
prisons to house inmates based on their “biological sex” rather than their gender 
identity. Following this, the Department of Justice claimed that sex discrimination 
in the workplace does not extend to trans people, the Department of Education 
rescinded Obama era guidance on bathroom usage in schools which protected 
trans students from discrimination, and Trump announced that he would impose a 
ban on all trans people from serving in the military in any capacity. In the past year, 
Trump has announced plans to rescind Obama era policy for homeless shelters 
which would allow shelters to deny access to trans Americans based on their 
gender identity, and suggested that trans Americans would no longer be 
guaranteed healthcare protections under the Affordable Healthcare Act.  
 In the past year, Trump announced plans to implement new policies which would 
allow adoption agencies to deny LGBTQ couples the ability to adopt, and allow 
doctors to deny medical care to LGBTQ Americans based on “religious 
exemptions”, and denied US Embassy buildings permission to fly the Pride flag 
from their buildings during Pride month.  
 In a New York Times profile on Vice President Mike Pence, Trump jokes on Pence 
when asked about LGBTQ rights “Don’t ask that guy – he wants to hang them all!”. 
(GLAAD, 2019)  
 
These restrictions to the rights and freedoms of LGBTQ Americans, and the rhetoric 
surrounding them, threaten to undermine the progress that the LGBTQ rights movement 
gained with the passing of Marriage Equality. Denying access to healthcare and allowing 
adoption agencies to refuse same sex couples removes two key benefits of marriage which 
fuelled the campaign for Marriage Equality – healthcare benefits and easier access to 
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adoption. Trump’s election, and the myriad of anti- LGBTQ policies and rhetoric that 
followed, constituted a backlash to the progress of the Obama era and clearly disrupts the 
narrative which positioned Marriage Equality as the happy ending for the LGBTQ rights 
movement – in fact rights which were so hard won can easily be taken away by an 
unsympathetic government. The Trump administration’s anti-LGBTQ stance also challenges 
notions of homonormativity as an effective tool in the LGBTQ rights movement. Alongside 
the threat of rescinding same sex marriage rights, or restrictions to the rights that made 
marriage desirable in the first place, sit actions taken to expel trans people from the 
military – suggesting that no matter how hard assimilationists have fought to gain access to 
typically heterosexual institutions, there is always the risk of rejection further down the 
line. If we are to tie Marriage Equality and homonormativity with gay happiness, as 
demonstrated in earlier chapters, then this happiness – or these symbols of happiness – are 
destabilised. It is no longer easy for network television to show a happy gay couple 
seamlessly entering into homonormative married life – especially if that couple features on 
a programme set in a modern day reality. It is no longer easy for such programmes to avoid 
engaging with issues of homophobia or transphobia, as said issues – though longstanding 
for those who are members of the community themselves– are now regular news items, 
forming part of the national (and international) conversation about Trump and his impact. 
Queer unhappiness is now difficult to ignore – as I will discuss later in this chapter - which 
poses a problem for neoliberal network television, which relies upon a precarious balance 
of staying relevant and maintaining mass appeal for its revenue.  
Recognising unhappiness disrupts happiness, so happiness requires a certain level of 
ignorance to survive. In order to work towards change, one must recognise a need for 
improvement. This requires an acknowledgement of lack, of something left wanting, of an 
imperfection, of an unhappiness. To be queer is to recognise that unhappiness and in that 
recognition become unhappy (Ahmed, 2010). For gay characters on network television this 
unhappiness is not permitted. Will & Grace was criticised for being a programme about gay 
characters that avoided gay political issues during its initial run: 
Will & Grace had a decidedly gay sensibility, two openly gay characters, and 
relatively explicit references to gay sex, but the series carefully avoided representing 
same-sex physical intimacy and overtly political storylines. (Becker, 2006, 172) 
Will’s presence as an openly gay lead character on primetime network television could 
easily be seen as a political statement in and of itself, however NBC – wary of committing 
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to “gay TV” after the failure of Ellen – made it clear that Will & Grace was not a political 
programme (Becker, 2006). During the first eight seasons of the programme, only one 
romantic same sex kiss was shown just as the programme was ending. Political storylines 
were avoided and homophobia went largely unseen. A notable exception would be the 
season two episode Acting Out, where Will and Jack protest the censure of a gay kiss on 
television, joining a protest outside the network offices and eventually kissing as part of the 
protest. The episode was a clear nod to complaints about Will & Grace’s avoidance of same 
sex intimacy on screen – the network Will and Jack protest is their own: NBC – though the 
issue is never resolved. Instead the same sex kiss produced in the episode is a joke, an 
awkward interaction between two friends who we are repeatedly told have no attraction 
to each other.  
The avoidance of gay issues also allowed NBC to distance itself from the failure of Ellen 
which was widely criticised for being “too gay”:  
Of the twenty episodes of Ellen that aired after the main character came out, fifteen 
focused on lesbian storylines; of the first twenty episodes of Will & Grace, only one 
focused on a gay storyline. (Streitmatter, 2009, 117) 
The ratings failure of Ellen showed the network that audiences, and advertisers, were not 
ready to embrace gay programming which focused primarily on gay issues, but the ratings 
success of Ellen’s “The Puppy Episode” (which featured Ellen’s coming out after a long press 
campaign) indicated that viewers were interested in seeing gay characters on screen 
(Becker, 2006). By making Will’s homosexuality a feature of his personality rather than an 
influence on his life, Will & Grace was able to harness the controversial buzz that a gay 
character would create whilst making the character’s gayness palatable for audiences and 
advertisers who did not want to take a political stance on gay rights. Will must remain 
disengaged from gay politics as he must remain happy for audiences to keep tuning in and 
for advertisers to keep making money. Audiences deserted Ellen for engaging too often 
with gay issues, and therefore bringing gay issues to the attention of a widespread network 
viewership (Becker, 2006; Tropiano, 2002; Streitmatter, 2009). By drawing attention to the 
problems gay Americans face, Ellen implied a need for change, shattering the illusion of 
happiness for the audience by shining a light on gay unhappiness. Will & Grace, however, 
glossed over such problems and instead portrayed a happy gay man whose sexuality rarely, 
if ever, impacted his life. Will is a successful, affluent lawyer who maintains a good 
relationship with his parents and wider family, has a close group of friends both gay and 
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straight, and has an active love life. He experiences none of the loneliness, illness, mental 
health problems or societal rejection that the gay characters of the 70s and 80s presented. 
His life is a happy one, his happiness existing alongside his gayness and his periods of 
unhappiness unrelated to his sexuality. In other words, Ellen strayed outside of network 
television’s neoliberal constraints, leaning further left than was acceptable for NBC to 
maintain its apolitical, centrist image. Will & Grace however, allowed for gay 
representation within a neoliberal context, remaining stridently apolitical and therefore 
potentially enjoyable for audiences across the political spectrum9.  
Sara Ahmed discusses the political importance of recognising queer unhappiness in her 
work The Promise of Happiness. She talks about how the unhappy queer ending allowed for 
many queer works to be published in times where they would otherwise have been 
banned. For Ahmed, queer unhappiness facilitates queer visibility, not only in its most basic 
sense – allowing queer characters to be seen – but also in the visibility of queerness rather 
than purely gayness – the acknowledgement of a gay politics and of a queer resistance to 
subjugation.  
We can see too the importance of embracing the unhappy queer, rather than simply 
placing our hopes in an alternative figure of the happy queer. The unhappy queer is 
unhappy with the world that reads queers as unhappy. The risk of promoting the 
happy queer is that the unhappiness of this world could disappear from view. We 
must stay unhappy in this world. (2010, 105) 
Strict adherence to presenting gay characters as happy risks ignoring the difficulties of 
living life as a queer person in the US. The erasure of homophobia from fictional characters’ 
lives in favour of homonormative storylines in which gay characters’ troubles are solved by 
finding love, getting married, and having children (as in Grey’s Anatomy and Glee), may be 
intended to counteract decades of tragic gay narratives but may also have the (potentially 
intentional) consequence of presenting Marriage Equality as the solution to all gay 
problems, implying that all gay work has been done, and gay people can “settle down” and 
live “happily ever after”. Rather than purely celebrating the possibility of gay happiness 
(even within a homonormative frame), Ahmed advocates for embracing queer unhappiness 
as a necessary form of political action, as a way of ensuring that which propagates queer 
unhappiness is seen and therefore able to be changed.  
                                                          
9 Ellen’s position as a controversial, liberal leaning programme is, in 2019, now somewhat 
undermined by Ellen DeGeneres’ decidedly neoliberal and centrist political stance. 
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Ahmed connects unhappiness with the idea of freedom, suggesting that recognising 
unhappiness, and allowing oneself to be unhappy, is a kind of emancipation from the work 
of maintaining happiness: 
The freedom to be unhappy would be the freedom to be affected by what is 
unhappy, and to live a life that might affect others unhappily. The freedom to be 
unhappy would be the freedom to live a life that deviates from the paths of 
happiness, wherever that deviation takes us. It would this mean the freedom to 
cause unhappiness by acts of deviation. (2010, 195) 
By allowing for unhappiness, and recognising unhappy things, one allows space for paths 
other than that which are signposted as happiness bringers. One allows for the rejection of 
happiness, and therefore a rejection of happiness objects such as marriage and children. By 
giving space to unhappiness, one gives space to queerness itself. If network television were 
to allow for queer unhappiness, it would risk allowing space for political queerness on 
screen, upsetting the neoliberal balance needed to appeal to Americans across the political 
spectrum, and maintain the mass market appeal needed to fuel its economic model.  
The revival series of Will & Grace strays further from the neoliberal “middle way” than the 
original series ever dared to, presenting a more aware Will & Grace, with episodes that 
engage much more extensively with politics and issues affecting the gay community. The 
revival itself was borne out of a renewed interest in the series as a political influencer, after 
the success of an online short entitled #VoteHoney in which the cast reunited in a short 
scene intended to encourage viewers to vote for Hillary Clinton (whose neoliberalism was 
widely criticised during the Democratic Primaries by more left leaning voters) in the 2016 
elections. In the short, Will and Grace try to convince Jack to vote for Hillary as he is 
registered in a swing state and is yet to make up his mind. Karen plays the villain as a 
parodic Trump supporter. This short primed audiences for a more politically engaged Will & 
Grace, and its success reassured the network that audiences would respond well to this 
shift, in a new, changing political environment. 
In the first episode of the revival series – 11 Years Later – Will is flirting with his 
congressman despite their positions on different sides of the political aisle, and Grace is 
considering taking a job redecorating the Oval Office for the newly elected Donald Trump. 
Both Will and Grace struggle with choosing between the personal and the political – Will is 
attracted to his congressman and wants to secure a date with him, but fundamentally 
disagrees with his political stance, Grace knows that designing a White House interior 
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would be an important step in her career and would earn her a lot of money, but ultimately 
cannot stomach working for a president she abhors. By the end of the episode both Will 
and Grace answer to their political consciences. Will gives up on the idea of dating the 
congressman and Grace turns down the White House job. The final shot of the episode is 
inside the Oval Office where Grace has left a “Make America Gay Again” red hat atop the 
president’s chair, as a small act of political defiance (See fig. 15). This episode sets out a 
remit for the rest of the series. This is a new Will & Grace which isn’t afraid to engage with 
politics albeit in the context of a network sitcom, where structure and form demand that 
the characters’ situations remain the same, and commerciality requires a level of 
impartiality in order to retain a wide reaching audience. LGBTQ issues are not the focus 
here, rather the issues which Will and his congressman disagree on are specified as 
environmental. It is Grace who brings up gay rights with the leaving of the cap, and even 
then only in a gesture, not in words. Whilst positioning itself as categorically anti- Trump, 
Will & Grace also makes it clear that politics will not get in the way of their traditional 
sitcom dynamic. Whereas in real life, actress Debra Messing is vocal in her denouncing of 
Trump’s supporters, her character puts aside her political outrage to continue her 
friendship with Karen, who not only voted for Trump but is close personal friends with the 
First Family. Sitcom character Grace will not compromise her politics for professional gain, 
but will not lose her friendships over political affiliation. There is a limit here to which Will 
& Grace will allow its characters’ political allegiances to interfere with their personal lives – 
a limit which doesn’t exist in the real world outside of network television and sitcom 
structure.   
With 11 Years Later, Will & Grace disrupts its previous commitment to homonormativity, 
showing that it is no longer possible for LGBTQ Americans and their allies to live their lives 
without engaging in politics. Will and Grace are no longer able to put aside their political 
beliefs in order to prioritise personal gain – politics has in fact become unavoidably 
personal. Will’s political beliefs disrupt his personal relationships, and thwart his ability to 
pursue a romantic relationship. Political integrity here is shown as more important than 
finding someone to settle down with, a choice that seems directly influenced by the 
political climate in which it was made.  
A more explicitly queer political storyline can be found in Grandpa Jack which centres on 
the issue of conversion therapy. The plot focuses on Will and Jack’s attempts to rescue 
Jack’s newly discovered grandson (Skip) from a conversion camp, and to try and convince 
Jack’s estranged son Elliot to accept his son’s potential homosexuality. By engaging with 
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issues that cause queer unhappiness – the enduring presence of conversion therapy for 
queer youth, and the familial rejection that almost always goes hand in hand with this – 
Will & Grace makes space for queerness itself. After succeeding in sneaking Skip out of the 
camp, Jack has a heart to heart with his grandson which emphasises the potential for a 
happy queer future, whilst also recognising the unhappiness and pain that Skip may have to 
endure in the present: 
Jack: It was hard for me once too, but believe me it gets better. 
Skip: I don’t see how. 
Jack: Skip you are going to invited to so many good dinner parties. And there’s  
         something else. When you get older, you’ll understand that there’s the family  
         you were born into and the family that you choose. And the family that I chose, 
         well it doesn’t get any better than that. 
Skip: But what will I do now? 
Jack: I don’t know. Your hero Will didn’t really think this through. You’re just going to  
          have to be strong.  
Skip: It’s hard being me sometimes. 
Jack: I know. But I’m going to be there for you as much as I can. And when I’m not, I  
          want you to picture me in your head, looking at you like I am right now, and  
          saying you are exactly who you are supposed to be.  
(Will & Grace: Grandpa Jack, 2018) 
This rare serious moment for Jack is a celebration of his life as a gay man, with a chosen 
family of friends. Jack doesn’t tell his grandson that he’ll find love, settle down, and get 
married. Instead the happiness objects Jack references are dinner parties, his community of 
friends, and the value of being himself. The concept of a “chosen family” deviates from the 
homonormative paths to happiness which value marriage and reproduction, instead 
prioritising community and common experience over biological ties and romantic love (Hull 
& Ortyl, 2019). Jack’s happiness stems not from romantic fulfilment of homonormativity, 
but from his pride as a gay man and from the support of his friends. Jack’s “It Gets Better” 
speech (a clear reference to the It Gets Better Campaign of 2010), doesn’t reference 
marriage at all, or in fact any political gains made by the LGBTQ rights campaign. The advice 
he passes on to the next generation of gay youth is focused specifically on the individual 
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queer experience, and the aspects of gay life that are specific to the queer community, 
from stereotypical references to “dinner parties” to the common experience of growing up 
in a family that may not understand you. Homonormativity does not factor in, in fact, Jack 
advises against Skip assimilating at all, encouraging him to be “exactly who he is supposed 
to be”.  
In order to promise Skip a happier future, Jack has to recognise his unhappy present. Will & 
Grace does not shy away from Skip’s reality as a gay child in a conservative household. Jack 
acknowledges that Skip’s life will be difficult and he will have to endure hardships in order 
to get to a place of happiness later in life. Ahmed writes “To narrate unhappiness can be 
affirmative; it can gesture toward another world, even if we are not given a vision of the 
world as it might exist after the walls of misery are brought down.” (2010, 107). By 
recognising Skip’s queer unhappiness, Grandpa Jack recognises the potential for change. By 
showing Skip’s life as a gay youth as hard, Will & Grace gestures to a world where his life 
could be easier, whether that be a happy future once he outgrows his conservative 
household, or a world where his parents accept his sexuality and celebrate their son for 
who he is. This recognition of the hardships of gay life is again indicative of a shift in Will & 
Grace’s and NBC’s willingness to address political issues. Skip’s line “It’s hard being me 
sometimes” is a simple acknowledgement that gay lives are not always happy ones, and yet 
it would likely not have featured in Will & Grace’s original series, during a time where gay 
people had far less legal rights and protections than they do now. This line, in 2018, 
recognises that all gay problems were not solved by Marriage Equality, and that the LGBTQ 
rights movement still has battles to fight. This willingness to reference queer unhappiness 
may also be a result of the political instability of the Trump era, where audiences are seen 
as more accepting of political storylines as politics is increasingly difficult to avoid in 
everyday life.  
By the end of Grandpa Jack, Jack’s son Elliot has changed his mind about sending Skip to 
the conversion camp. He takes his son home, with the promise of trying to be more 
understanding. The episode ends with a moment of queer joy, when Elliot asks Jack if he 
would like to take his grandson to his first Broadway show, leaving Jack overcome with 
emotion. Will & Grace provides a queer happy ending for Skip and for Jack who has 
reconciled with his estranged son, and is comforted by the knowledge that his grandson 
will have a happier childhood. However, there is no further mention of the conversion 
camp, or the other children who are left there. The story as it pertains to Jack ends happily, 
wrapped up in a sitcom bow which restores the status quo by the end credits. The wider 
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issue of conversion therapy is not resolved. The children who don’t have a gay family 
member to save them are left to suffer the abuses of the camp “Straighten Arrow”. It 
would have been easy for Will & Grace to include a line about having the camp investigated 
or shut down, not doing so seems to be a direct choice. Sitcom structure constraints 
demand that the central story ends happily, that problems are resolved and the characters’ 
lives are brought back to equilibrium (Mills, 2005). Therefore Jack’s conversation with his 
son works. Elliot’s homophobia is undone and he is easily able to convince his conservative 
wife to change her views. However, Will & Grace resists suggesting that all homophobia 
can be solved with a quick chat, leaving audiences with the knowledge that conversion 
therapy still exists and there are countless other families like Skip’s whose issues aren’t 
solvable with a twenty four minute episode of network television.  
Though Will & Grace wears its liberal heart on its sleeve in many episodes of its revival 
series, it does not escape the neoliberal constraints of its network setting altogether. The  
episode The Beefcake and the Cake Beef, is a send up of the pending Supreme Court case 
“Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission” which aims to stop 
businesses in the US from being able to refuse service to LGBTQ people on the basis of 
“religious exemption”. In the episode Karen orders a cake from a bakery as a gift to Donald 
Trump for his birthday. She wants the cake to have his “MAGA” slogan iced on the top and 
the bakery refuses to complete the order as they disagree with Trump’s politics. Grace 
sticks up for Karen, insisting that this is a free speech issue and though she may not agree 
with Karen or Trump, they both have the right to be served by the business. The episode 
takes a centrist view of the issue, foregrounding capitalism and free speech over the risk of 
legitimising neo-fascism. Grace’s opinion is shown as correct, her equation of the rights of 
LGBTQ Americans and the rights of Trump supporters are never questioned, and she sticks 
to her guns, even when confronted by a group of Trump administration victim stand-ins (a 
disabled person, a Latinx immigrant, a trans man and a woman). Eventually, the baker 
relents and bakes the cake with the final scene showing that being known as the bakery 
that made a cake for Trump has in fact boosted business. The last joke of the episode sees 
Grace flirting with a man in front of her in the queue, who then complains to the baker that 
the swastika on his cake is askew. Grace rolls her eyes and says “Why are the hot ones 
always gay or Nazis?” (Will & Grace: The Beefcake and the Cake Beef, 2018). The existence 
of Nazis in America in 2018 is played for laughs, and the episode refuses to interrogate the 
thorny issue of free speech vs de-platforming fascism, instead presenting the issue as a 
simple one of liberal hypocrisy. This episode provides a right wing skewing counterpart to 
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the more liberal political episodes of the season’s run, pushing Will & Grace back into a 
neoliberal space and making the show a safe choice again for the network which must 
appease its mass market base, and its advertisers who may well have skin in the Trump 
game.  The Beefcake and the Cake Beef demonstrates that political engagement, even in 
this new era of political relevance and uncertainty, is difficult for networks to fully 
embrace, especially within a sitcom format whose primary aim is to make people laugh, not 
to make people think.  
The unique timings of Will & Grace as a gay sitcom produced before and after both 
Marriage Equality and Trump’s election, allows for a reading of the programme as a 
reflection of the shift in gay politics between the prevalence of a more assimilative “we’re 
just like you” approach of the late 1990s/early 2000s (in the run up to Marriage Equality), 
and the queerer focus of the post Trump era. The direct attacks on the LGBTQ community 
coming from the Trump administration make it impossible for Will & Grace to take the 
same apolitical stance as it once had. Not only are audiences now willing to accept politics 
in their network programming, there is now an expectation that queer programming will 
engage with queer politics in recognition of television’s impact as an instrument of social 
change – rather than just a reflection of it. In its revival series Will & Grace was challenged 
to meet the standard set by its original series run as influencer on LGBTQ rights. Former 
Vice President Joe Biden once said of Will & Grace: 
I think Will & Grace probably did more to educate the American public [on LGBT 
issues] than almost anything anybody has ever done so far. And I think people fear 
that which is different. Now they’re beginning to understand. (Deschamps & Singer, 
2017, 125) 
If the original Will & Grace influenced America’s opinions on same sex marriage during the 
fight for marriage equality, then the revival series must engage with the new challenges 
that LGBTQ Americans face under a Trump administration. Where the original series 
avoided political content in order to present a homonormative image of happy gay people 
who were “just like everyone else”, the revival series takes a more direct approach, 
engaging with politics insofar as its sitcom constraints, and the restrictions of its neoliberal 
network home, will allow, to shine a light on some of the issues facing LGBTQ Americans 
and maintain its status as a programme that has a social conscience. This new approach to 
political content on network television requires and acknowledgement of queer 
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unhappiness, of queerness itself, and a disruption of the hegemonic myth of happy gay 



























Network television representations of gay and lesbian happiness have clearly been 
influenced by the prioritisation of Marriage Equality by LGBTQ rights campaigns, and the 
passing of Marriage Equality legislature by the Supreme Court decision of 2015. The 
connections that can be made between marriage, happiness and homonormativity allow 
networks to present gay characters in a way that upholds their neoliberal identity – giving 
gay audiences representations of gay characters achieving happiness, whilst reinforcing 
homonormative ideals of marriage and upholding heterosexist, capitalist institutions. I have 
argued that these representations have contributed to the narrative of Marriage Equality 
as the happy ending to the LGBTQ rights movement, implying that just as Callie’s struggle 
to be accepted by her family is solved by her marriage in Grey’s Anatomy, the LGBTQ 
community’s quest for acceptance is solved by the success of the Marriage Equality 
campaign.  
I have discussed how the connections formed by such representations position 
homonormativity as the only method of achieving happiness for gay and lesbian 
individuals, and the LGBTQ community as a whole. This privileging of marriage and 
homonormativity as a happiness bringer allows for a stigmatisation of queerness as the 
cause of unhappiness for gay and lesbian characters, as shown in my analysis of Connor’s 
journey from queer casual sex and self-loathing, to happy, domestic, monogamy in How to 
Get Away with Murder. I have examined how the historic figure of the tragic homosexual 
has been replaced by representations of happy gay characters who conform to 
homonormative frames, and tragic queer figures whose deviation from Ahmed’s 
“straightening devices” into queerness causes them to become unhappy – as in Oliver’s HIV 
storyline.  
I have also shown how further shifts in the US political climate during the Trump era have 
impacted on how network television engages with gay politics, disrupting the “happy 
ending” narrative of Marriage Equality and causing queer unhappiness to appear in places 
where it was previously unseen – as in Will & Grace’s revival series. I have discussed how 
such representations of queer unhappiness can form the impetus for political action, and 
are therefore vital to the continued existence of an LGBTQ rights movement.  
Where other works have analysed the development of gay and lesbian representation in a 
historical context (Becker, 2006; Streitmatter, 2009), I have focused specifically on 
Marriage Equality as a supposed turning point in the narrative of the LGBTQ rights 
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movement. Instead of discussing gay and lesbian representations as purely causes of social 
change or products of political shifts, I have instead contextualised these representations 
as a combination of both. Through analysing the political, social and economic context in 
which these representations exist, I have shown how network television reacts to societal 
changes and in turn influences that change.  This thesis therefore contributes to discussions 
not just in television studies itself, but also in queer theory, and historical discussions of the 
LGBTQ rights movement.  
Whilst this thesis has focused specifically on network television, it is important to note that 
alternative representations of gay and lesbian marriage can be found on cable television 
and on streaming services. These economics of these models work differently to network 
channels, allowing for programming which does not have to conform to neoliberal ideals, is 
able to appeal to a niche market instead of a mass American public, and can push 
boundaries further than network channels who rely upon advertiser revenue for their 
bottom line. For example, the Hulu – a streaming service in the US – production The 
Handmaid’s Tale contains a subplot involving a lesbian who was separated from her wife 
and child during the country’s overthrow by fascist forces. In The Handmaid’s Tale, 
Marriage Equality is rendered meaningless, as the character’s legal marriage to her wife is 
no longer recognised by the fascist state, forcing her to stay in “Gilead” and become a 
handmaid, whilst her wife and son escape to Canada. Hulu’s position as a streaming service 
allows for a representation of same sex marriage which is definitively not the solution to 
any problems, but in fact is a fragile right, which is easily rendered redundant if the 
circumstances allow. Netflix’s sequel instalment of Tales from the City also presents an 
alternative view of marriage for its queer characters in a flashback episode where trans 
matriarch Anna Madrigal turns down the chance to get married and live a “normal” life 
when she realises her assimilation would mean turning her back on her queer community, 
and would require her renouncement of her queer identity and of her trans activism. Both 
these programmes aired after Trump’s election in 2016, so it is worth questioning whether 
it is in fact their timing, alongside their economic freedoms as streaming services, which 
allows for these representations of marriage which counteract the narrative of Marriage 
Equality as “happy ending”.  
There is also much to research about how marriage is presented for LGBTQ characters who 
are not gay or lesbian – or not just gay or lesbian. I have not explored trans representations 
(such as Anna Madrigal in Tales from the City), gender non-conforming characters, or 
bisexual characters (though Callie from Grey’s Anatomy is bisexual, her story is in the 
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context of a lesbian relationship). This is partially because such representations are few and 
far between on network television, but they do exist and their inclusion by network 
programming is increasing. Examinations of these types of queer character’s relationship to 
marriage would prove interesting further study.  
Similarly, the examples of gay and lesbian representations I have chosen to use here are of 
predominantly white, middle class characters. Though characters such as Callie from Grey’s 
Anatomy and Santana from Glee are of Latinx descent, and Oliver from How to Get Away 
with Murder is Asian, their race does not intersect with the representations of their 
sexuality – aside from Callie and Santana’s struggles to be accepted by their families for 
religious reasons which are loosely related to their Latin culture. Again, representations of 
non-white gay and lesbian characters on network television, which deal specifically with 
issues of race, and how racism intersects with homophobia, are not prevalent, though they 
can be found on cable channels and streaming services. Interesting points for further study 
in this area would be programmes such as Queen Sugar on OWN, The Chi on Showtime, 
Pose on FX, and Boomerang on BET, alongside streaming service programmes such as 
Netflix’s Orange is the New Black, She’s Gotta Have It, and Dear White People all of which 
present black LGBTQ identified characters in programmes which focus in part on race.  
As my thesis is grounded in historical context, it is clear that aspects of my research will 
change over time. For example, both How to Get Away with Murder and Will & Grace are 
due to air their final seasons in the latter half of this year. The ways in which these series 
deal with marriage at the end of their runs may well contradict what I have said about 
them here, especially as Connor and Oliver’s wedding is set to feature in the final season of 
Murder. The changes I have mentioned as a result of the Trump administrations attempts 
to dismantle pro LGBTQ equality legislation may well continue, regardless of whether or 
not he is re-elected for a second term. Network television’s approaches to programming 
may also change, as streaming services continue to dominate the market and pose a threat 
to more traditional means of watching TV. However, as a snapshot of this specific period of 
time, where Marriage Equality could easily have be portrayed as the end of LGBTQ rights 
campaigning as we know it, I believe my thesis to be successful in its connection of political 
movements and on screen representations, even if these connections are undermined by 
future storylines.  
Through my discussion of the connections between happiness, homonormativity and 
Marriage Equality, I have demonstrated that the positioning of marriage as a bringer of 
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happiness to gay and lesbian characters implies that alternative ways of living are 
automatically unhappy. This privileges homonormativity, and demonises queerness, 
allowing for a silencing of queer voices and an erasure of LGBTQ lives which do not 
conform to homonormative ideals. Ahmed insists “we must stay unhappy in this world” 
(2010, 105) in order to continue the work of fighting for true equality, and I would argue 
that this statement also applies to representations on television. There must be unhappy 
gay characters on our screens, alongside gay characters who find happiness in queer spaces 
or in places outside of homonormative institutions. There must be space for queerness on 
network television, and for representations of same sex marriage which allow for 
unhappiness. We must not allow a representation of gay unhappiness as resolved by 
Marriage Equality to be perhaps the only representation of gayness a middle America 
family may see. We must instead provide a mass market gay representation which reflects 
the reality of the LGBTQ rights movement as far from over, and of Marriage Equality as far 
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Fig. 1: Jack breaks the fourth wall in 11 Years Later… 
 






Fig. 3: Meredith and Derek’s spontaneous courtroom wedding 
 




Fig. 5: Christina’s realisation 
 








Fig. 7: Meredith cuts off Christina’s wedding dress 
 
Fig. 8: Christina is held by Meredith, “her person”, as she cries in relief at the cancellation 





Fig. 9: Arizona’s unhappiness is reserved for before the wedding. 
 







Fig. 11: Connor stands in Oliver’s bedroom doorway as he reveals his HIV diagnosis 
 







Fig. 13: Connor encounters a stranger at Oliver’s door whilst trying to mend their 
relationship 
 







Fig. 15: Grace’s small protest – a Make America Gay Again hat in the Oval Office. 
 
 
 
